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Abstract 
Since accounting environment changed remarkably in the beginning of 21st century, it raised 
concerns whether audit fees have increased excessively after that. The main reason for concern was 
additional regulation know as SOX, introduced in 2002. It tightened the requirements for both, firms 
preparing financial statements, as well as for auditors reviewing those statements. Besides of 
additional requirements, SOX also prohibited the providence of certain non-audit related services 
that auditors offered pre-SOX. This added pressure for auditors, and therefore expectations were that 
audit fees increased considerably post-SOX. For examining this, the purpose of this research was to 
study what the relative audit fee ratio has been, and how it has developed over time during years 
2000-2017. By this it was possible to observe if audit fees have increased or not, and is there clearly 
visible long-term trends or changes that occurred only at certain time. In addition to general view of 
audit fee development, relative audit fees were also examined by controlling client size. This way it 
could be studied whether relative audit fees have been acting differently between smaller and bigger 
clients.  
Method used in this study was quantitative analysis, where time series analyses over years 
2002-2017 were created for audit fees that are in relation to company’s sales. Besides this, relative 
audit fees were also examined by regression analyses that included both, simple regression analys is 
as well as multiple regression analysis. These were for achieving more accurate results of growth 
over time. Both methods were used for different samples, such as whole sample, deciles and BIG4 
auditors versus non-BIG4 auditors. Especially with deciles the tests concentrated on client size. The 
data was obtained from Audit Analytics’ database, and final sample was comprehensive, includ ing 
123,880 firm-year observations. Study’s main findings were that audit fees have increased 
remarkably during the investigation period, and that main growth occurred during SOX adjustments, 
that is, between years 2001-2005. It was also clearly proved that smaller firms faced relatively higher 
audit fees, and that fees have also increased more for them than for bigger firms. It was also found 
that BIG4-premium existed, but only for smaller firms, and that after SOX came into effect, majority 
of audit firms’ fees were coming from audits, not from audit related or non-audit services as was 
before. As a conclusion, it can be said that audit fees increased considerably during the past two 
decades, but the relative share was only high for smaller firms. Audit fee ratios for bigger firms were 
surprisingly low, and rather decreasing than increasing, especially after SOX came into force.   
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Tiivistelmä 
Kun taloudellinen ympäristö muuttui merkittävästi 2000-luvun alussa, se herätti kysymyksiä 
tilintarkastuspalkkioiden tasosta ja siitä, ovatko palkkiot kasvaneet jo liian suuriksi. Pääsyy eri 
sidosryhmien huolelle oli lakiuudistus nimeltä SOX, joka tiukensi huomattavasti tilinpäätökseen 
liittyvää lainsäädäntöä. Vaatimukset lisääntyivät niin tilinpäätösten laatijoille, kuin myös 
tilintarkastajille, ja sääntely myös kielsi tai rajasi tiettyjen tilintarkastuspalvelujen tarjontaa. Etenkin 
näistä syistä tilintarkastuspalkkioiden pelättiin kasvaneen liiallisiksi SOX-sääntelyn voimaan 
astumisen jälkeen. Tutkiakseni tätä kehitystä, tutkielman tavoitteena oli tarkastella suhteellis ten 
tilintarkastuspalkkioiden tasoa ja kehitystä yli ajan vuosina 2000-2017. Tämän avulla oli mahdollis ta 
tutkia, ovatko tarkastuspalkkiot todella kasvaneet, ja onko pitkäaikaisia trendejä tai muutoks ia 
tiettyinä ajankohtina selkeästi havaittavissa. Lisäksi tarkoituksena oli tutkia suhteellis ia 
tilintarkastuspalkkioita kontrolloimalla asiakkaan kokoa. Näin pystyttiin tarkastelemaan, onko 
palkkioiden käyttäytymisessä havaittavissa eroavaisuuksia pienten ja suurten yritysten välillä.   
Tutkielman metodina käytettiin kvantitatiivista analyysia, jossa liikevaihtoon suhteutetuil le 
tilintarkastuspalkkioille luotiin aikasarja-analyyseja vuosille 2000-2017. Tämän lisäksi suhteellis ia 
palkkioita tutkittiin myös regressioanalyysien avulla, joissa käytettiin niin yksinkertaisia kuin myös 
moninkertaisia regressioita. Näiden avulla pyrittiin saamaan tarkempia tuloksia koskien yli ajan 
tapahtuvaa muutosta. Molempia metodeja käytettiin eri otannoille, kuten kokonaisotannalle, eri 
desiileille ja otannalle, missä vertailtiin BIG4 tarkastajia sekä ei-BIG4 tarkastajia. Data hankitt iin 
Audit Analytics -tietokannasta, ja lopullinen otanta koostui kattavasti 123 880 havainnos ta. 
Tutkimuksen tärkeimpiä löydöksiä oli se, että suhteellisten tilintarkastuspalkkio iden taso oli selkeästi 
kasvanut tutkimusperiodin aikana, ja että suurin yksittäinen kasvu tapahtui vuosina 2001-2005, 
jolloin SOX implementointiin ja sen vaikutukset olivat suurimmillaan. Lisäksi oli selkeästi 
nähtävissä että pienemmät yritykset kohtasivat korkeampia palkkioita, ja että palkkiot myöskin 
kasvoivat enemmän pienten yritysten kohdalla. Tuloksista oli myös nähtävissä, että BIG4-premium 
on olemassa, mutta vain pienille firmoille, ja että sen jälkeen kun SOX astui voimaan, suurin osa 
tilintarkastajien palkkioista tuli puhtaasti tilintarkastuksista, päinvastoin kuten ennen SOX:ia oli. 
Yhteenvetona voidaankin todeta, että tilintarkastuspalkkiot kasvoivat merkittävästi viimeisen 17 
vuoden aikana, mutta suhteellinen taso oli ainoastaan korkea pienille yrityksille. Suurten yritysten 
palkkiotasot olivat yllättävän matalia, ja enemmänkin laskeneet kuin nousseet, etenkin vuoden 2005 
jälkeen. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation for the study 
 
After several major accounting scandals in the beginning of 21st century, there has been discussion 
whether audit itself, but also audit quality, have met their goals. Audits should ensure that generally 
accepted accounting principles and standards are complied with, but after Enron and Arthur Andersen 
scandals, this was widely questioned. Trust among different stakeholders weakened remarkably, and 
regulators had to act in order to restore their trust. For that reason, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (later SOX) 
was created in year 2002, which effected accounting and auditing environment considerably. (See 
e.g. Holm & Zaman 2012). Related to this, it has also been discussed if audit fees have gone up too 
high. The implement of SOX as well as the uncertainty in the markets should undoubtedly have 
increased audit fee levels during the past two decades. In addition, also The Great Recession occurred 
within this time, which also should have had impact on accounting environment and through that to 
audit fees as well. There has also been doubts whether SOX improved audit quality after all, and that 
the regulation was too restrictive and excessive. These aspects create an interesting starting point for 
studying what the actual audit fee levels have been, what are the factors affecting to them and how 
they have reacted to these changes, such as SOX, during the investigation period. 
 
As mentioned above, there have been discussions whether audit fee levels are too high. For instance, 
Beattie et al.  (2000, 196-197) studied negotiations between audit engagement partners and finance 
directors (FD), and they found that clients were unsatisfied with fee levels: “One FD expresses his 
expectation that auditors would stand their ground on everything but fees.” and: ”The only items are 
fees and the unacceptable size of them.” This study suggested that clients are not satisfied with fee 
levels, and they also feel powerless during price negotiations when compared to auditor. This raises 
questions whether especially the position of small companies is not equal with bigger firms during 
price discussions, and when engaging a new auditor. Smaller firms are not seen as important clients 
for audit firms as bigger ones are, and they may also include more risk than client with bigger sales. 
That is why it is worth investigating for whether mentioned events have had more effect on different 
sized companies, that is, have smaller organizations suffered more from new regulation for example. 
Hence, this comparison between different sized auditees is included in the study, when it should give 
more precise results of how the company size affects the final audit fee level. 
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There are also ethical aspects related to audits and audit fees that concern stakeholders, when for 
example audit firm concentration in terms of BIG41 raise questions of cartel-like behavior and 
diminished competition. If only four biggest audit firms conduct majority of the audits, it is worth 
asking for are the markets working as in competitive environment? When the providence of audit 
services is that centralized, especially among public companies which tend to use BIG4-auditors, it 
enables higher asking prices. Another ethical issue relating to this is auditor independence. It has 
raised serious concerns among regulators and other stakeholders, that auditor independence is 
endangered when the relationship between auditor and client last for a long time, and when achieved 
economic benefits are considerable. This can lead to reduced audit quality and misleading financ ia l 
statements, as well as to unequal treatment regarding different clients. These in turn may affect the 
audit fee levels. According to Hay (2017), there is consistent evidence that audit fees for new 
engagements are lower, and that non-audit services affect independence in appearance. Therefore, 
also factors affecting audit quality are reviewed in this thesis, and ethical issues are discussed 
throughout the whole study.  
 
There are lots of prior studies around this topic, but majority of them concentrate on factors affecting 
audit fees, or how audit fees correlate to audit quality, but not the actual level of them or their long-
term development. Studies regarding how SOX, Enron, Arthur Andersen and Great Recession 
affected audit fees and audit quality are done frequently. For instance, Chambers and Payne (2011) 
and Iliev (2010) studied how SOX affected audit fees, Choi et al. (2010) studied how audit quality is 
compromised when audit fees are high, Asthana et al. (2009) studied how Enron, Arthur Andersen 
and SOX all together affected US audit markets, and Choi et al. (2008) studied audit pricing regarding 
BIG4 and BIG4-premiums. All these researches examined audit fees in a certain way, but none of 
them reviewed long-term audit fee levels and trends. Hence, prior literature has approached audit fees 
more specifically, when in this study the main purpose is to study general audit fee levels and reasons 
behind their development over time. That is, there is rather long investigation period, and focus is on 
actual audit fees and trends evolved from them, rather than post-SOX effects on audit fees for 
example. One study that has similar approach with this study was done in year 2014 by Audit 
Analytics. They examined audit fees and non-audit fees with twelve-year trend, and therefore 
especially this paper is cited and used for comparison later in the study.  
                                                 
1 The Big4 at the time (2019) consisted of the following audit firms: Deloitte, Ernst & Young (EY), KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
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1.2 Methodology and scope of the study 
 
The methodology used in this paper is quantitative, using different analytical tools for creating time 
series analyses and regression analyses. Regression results are for achieving more detailed results of 
audit fees’ development, whereas time series analyses give general overview of how audit fees have 
been acting during the 21st century. In empirical research, the data will be first analyzed as a complete 
sample, without any distributions. After that, the data is divided into deciles by revenue and fiscal 
year. Thus, time series analysis and regression analysis are first created for complete sample, and 
after that for different deciles. By examining the data this way, differences between different sized 
firms should become more observable. The data used is obtained from Audit Analytics database, and 
it includes all fee data disclosed by SEC registrants in electronic filings since first of January 2000, 
until the end of year 2017. The final sample includes 123,880 firm-year observations. Data was 
exported from Audit Analytics’ database directly to software called SAS (Statistical Analys is 
System), which is used as a main analytical tool throughout the study. All data adjustments and 
empirical tests are implemented with SAS, and Microsoft Office tools are used for creating different 
kinds of graphs mainly. For examining research questions, four different hypotheses are formed and 
tested with SAS. Hypotheses are tested with both methods, that is, time series as well as regressions 
are used for achieving comprehensive empirical results. For regression analysis there are several 
regression models developed, and they include both, simple regression models as well as mult ip le 
regression models.  These are however introduced more carefully in Chapter 5.  
 
 
1.3 Research problem and main findings 
 
The main objective in this study is to examine how audit fees in relation to revenue have act during 
the past 18 years, and further, is there differences between smaller and bigger firms when considering 
this development. The two main research questions are then following:  
 
1)  Have audit fees in relation sales increased considerably during the examination period? 
2) Are there differences between smaller and bigger firms? Are smaller companies facing 
more relative audit fees? 
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Results from empirical tests managed to answer these two questions rather well. Firstly, both time 
series analysis and regression analysis proved that in general, relative audit fees have increased during 
the examination period and this increase can be considered as substantial. Based on time series 
analysis, audit fees in relation to sales increased by 87 percent during years 2000-2017, and that main 
growth occurred straight after year 2002 when SOX came into effect. For that reason, SOX can be 
seen as major influencer behind increased audit fee levels. Regression results supported this, when 
increase with this method resulted 67 percent growth in 18 years. Difference between these two 
results come from features related to methods, when percentage considering time series analysis is 
calculated by comparing first and last observed value, while regression results are based on linearity. 
In the data audit fee values have sawed back and forth during given time period, and for that reason 
linear regression model result indicate more steady and linear growth. Although, both methods give 
same overall conclusion, that is, audit fees in relation to sales have increased considerably between 
years 2000 and 2017.  
 
Second main finding is that there is clear difference in relative audit fees between small and large 
companies. When audit fees were reviewed by deciles, Decile 1 including companies with smalles t 
turnover, was facing remarkably higher audit fees than firms in bigger deciles. With Decile 1, the 
average audit fee ratio from sales was as high as 6 percent at highest, when for Decile 10 for instance 
it was around 0.06% at the same year. When compared to complete sample, the average audit fee 
ratio for them was around 0.7 percent. This seems rather low, when less than one percent from firm’s 
revenue is going for audit fees. However, results considering deciles revealed that this doesn’t 
represent the sample that well, when higher ratios for smaller deciles and lower values for bigger 
deciles distorts the average ratio of complete sample. In addition to this, it was also found that BIG4-
premium existed only for smaller deciles, and that bigger deciles got lower audit fees even when 
audited by BIG4-auditor. This can be seen as third major finding. Fourth important finding was that 
besides higher audit fee ratio for smaller firms, they also faced more increase in those fees. Hence, 
all these results suggest that audit fees in relation to sales have increased during the 21 st century, and 
that especially small firms face high relative audit fees and considerable increase in those. All 
empirical results were also in line with previous studies, when e.g. existence of BIG4-premium for 
small companies was already suggested by several authors. Additionally, all results were supported 
by sensitivity analyses. 
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1.4 Structure of the paper 
 
The paper starts by introducing the basic elements of audit fees and logic behind audit fee pricing in 
Chapter 2. This should help reader to understand the study better, when causation behind observed 
trends are clearer. In Chapter 3 audit quality is discussed, when it is essential part of audits and acts 
as a certain type of measure for them. It also compensates the money spent on audits when considering 
auditees. That is why it is important to include in the study, so that stakeholders’ view can be taken 
into account as well. In followed chapter, Chapter 4, study’s hypotheses and reasoning behind them 
are presented. In Chapter 5, the methodology of this study is introduced, and it covers data and 
sampling, as well as methods used in empirical research. In addition, models used in quantitat ive 
testing are also introduced in that chapter. After this, empirical tests and results can be presented. In 
Chapter 6, all empirical tests are conducted, and results discussed. The chapter starts by introduc ing 
descriptive statistics of the study, followed by audit fee analyses. As said before, audit fee analyses 
are first done for the whole sample without any sampling, and after that to different deciles. Lastly, 
in Chapter 6, a sensitivity analysis is formed for ensuring the robustness of achieved results. Finally, 
in the end of the thesis, conclusions of this study are presented. 
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2. PRICING OF AUDIT FEES 
 
When examining audit fee development and its appropriate level, it is important to understand the 
basic logic behind audit fee pricing.  There are several different factors that affect the final audit fee 
level, but in general audit fees are considered to be based on three factors: client size, complexity of 
the audit and the riskiness of the client. (See e.g. Firth 1997, 512.) All these factors affect directly the 
amount of work to be done in the audits, when audit of large, complex and risky firms requires more 
effort from an auditor. When the basic pricing is on hourly basis, every aspect that increases auditor’s 
effort, increase the audit fee as well. In addition to these, also the size of the auditor along with risks 
from the audit firm side can affect final audit fee level. These are however seen to have less influence 
than factors affecting from client’s side. There are also several different pricing models available that 
usually include factors that are important, but at the same time reliably measurable. However, models 
can differ remarkably from each other, and there’s no one, generally accepted method. In this chapter, 
first client dependent factors affecting audit fees are reviewed, followed by auditor dependent factors. 
After this, one of the basic pricing models used for audit fee pricing is introduced.  
 
 
2.1 Client dependent factors  
 
Most of the factors affecting audit fee level are depending on client. As mentioned above, especially 
customer size, the complexity of an audit as well as customer-related risks are the main aspects to 
consider when determining appropriate audit fee level. First comes the client size. The smaller the 
client is, the smaller the number of items in financial statements, at least in general. For example, 
smaller companies don’t usually have lots of impairments or other unusual items in their income 
statements. In addition, when the client is small, also the amount of entries inside of different items 
is smaller. For instance, entries in account receivables or in account payables are typically in direct 
relation to client size. The less turnover, the less account receivables, which in turn decreases the 
effort required from auditor, and therefore also the fee lowers. Conversely, the bigger the auditee, the 
bigger the fee. There are several studies supporting this, for instance Pong and Whittington (1994, 
1072) stated that: “The results of previous empirical studies of the determination of audit fees all 
show that, as would be expected, there is a strong correlation between audit fee and size of auditee.”  
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However, there are also factors that usually increase the fee when there’s a small client in question. 
One of these factors is the contribution of internal control. This in turn is directly linked to SOX, 
which requires to draw attention especially to company’s internal control. SOX was created because 
of several accounting crises in North America, such as Enron and Arthur Andersen scandals, where 
American energy company Enron went bankrupt, and their auditor, Arthur Andersen (AA), was 
accused of giving false audit opinions. This naturally weakened investors’ and other stakeholders’ 
confidence towards auditing. For restoring markets’ trust, the congress of United States set new 
federal law, where the main objective was to protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures. For example, to improve the independence of auditors and for 
avoiding auditor conflicts, SOX prohibits auditors from making certain types of assignments to their 
client companies, such as bookkeeping or giving investment advices. SOX also requires auditor 
rotation in order to enhance the auditor’s independence. Yet, SOX also requires auditors to audit 
internal control more thoroughly. SOX’s section 404 requires management and the external auditor 
to report on the adequacy of the company's internal control on financial reporting. (Gates et al. 2007; 
SOX-online, 2018) 
 
From auditor perspective, ensuring the quality of internal control and testing these controls may be 
as difficult to smaller companies that it is for larger ones. In some cases, it may be even easier to 
conduct for bigger firm, when usually big companies must pay more attention to internal control in 
order to meet all the requirements, and they also have more resources to do this. For that reason, in 
bigger firm internal control may be well designed, reported and documented, and also well monitored 
by the possible internal auditor of the firm. Better internal control means less difficult audit for 
external auditors, and therefore also the fee decreases. This assumption is supported by Felix et al. 
study (2001, 528-530): “Our results indicate that internal audit contribution is a significant 
determinant of the external audit fee. Specifically, the greater the contribution of the internal auditors 
to the financial statement audit, the lower the audit fee.” On the contrary, smaller firms may not have 
enough resources to pay attention to internal control sufficiently, and it is extremely rare to have own 
internal control department in small or medium size companies. According to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006, 190) for example, it is less expensive for a large company to develop better internal controls 
than it is for a small company, and their results also indicate that firms with fewer resources to invest 
in internal control, as proxied by the frequency of losses and greater financial distress, more often 
disclose problems with their internal controls. Therefore, auditors must take a lot of time in order to 
ensure, that the internal control is at the adequate level in that firm. This naturally increases the fee 
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level: “Our results show that audit fees are significantly higher for ICD (internal control deficienc y) 
firms after controlling for size, risk, and profitability. Furthermore, the fee increment is highest for  
firms that have the most substantial internal control problems.” (Hogan & Wilkins 2008, 236). 
Despite that there is both decreasing and increasing factors affecting audit fee level when considering 
client’s size, usually it is seen as positively correlated. Client size is however important to include in 
fee calculations, when it has direct influence on required audit work.   
 
Secondly after client size comes the complexity of an audit. If the business, operational environment, 
processes and the organization itself are complex, it means more audit work for ensuring satisfactory 
audit quality. For example, if client’s processes are long, complicated, and claim lot of resources, it 
takes time from auditor to ensure if the outcomes of these processes are correctly presented in 
financial statements. It also requires lot of time to test the controls attached to these processes. 
Additionally, the complexity of an audit often requires certain type of expertise, which naturally 
heightens the fee. In some cases there might be need for several experts from different fields, if the 
client operates in numerous regions for example. Then there must be knowledge of operational 
environments of different states or even different countries, if the organization operates 
multinationally. In addition to region knowledge, there should also be expertise about legislation and 
taxation of these areas. Furthermore, clients may have subsidiaries in different regions, so audit firm 
must also know about different organizational structures, mergers and acquisitions, as well as transfer 
pricing for instance. Lastly, one of the most important field of expertise is the industry expertise. 
Clients usually hope certain knowledge from their auditor considering the industry in which they 
operate. Gul et al. (2009) suggested that industry-specific knowledge is actually more important than 
client-specific knowledge, and that numerous audit-related issues are in fact linked to industry:  
 
“Though evidence suggests that client-specific knowledge plays an important role in 
conducting an effective audit, it may be argued that many audit-related issues are 
industry-specific and have unique industry features e.g. forward sales contracts, off 
balance sheet financing arrangements, accounting systems, tax rules or specialized 
reporting requirements in certain industries. Consequently, industry expertise is also 
likely to play a role in improving audit quality in terms of auditor competence, in 
addition to the general knowledge base required for all audits.” (Gul et al. 2009, 268) 
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As said, client size may have either increasing or decreasing effect on audit fee, but the complexity 
has not. The complexity of an audit has always increasing impact on effort, which means that the 
more complex audit, the higher the fee. Besides increased effort, from auditor’s perspective more 
complicated audit includes also more risks. Therefore, the fee level must compensate these risks as 
well. This leads us to third factor affecting audit fees, which is the riskiness of the client. In fact, both 
client size and complexity affect audit fee eventually because of risk. For instance, if the client size 
is large and the amount of entries inside of account receivables is also large, it means that there’s 
bigger risk for auditors not to detect something they should have detect. The same goes with 
complexity. The more there is items to be audited and the more there is complexity attached to these 
items, the more there is risk for auditors to bypass something important or alarming. That is why the 
Audit Risk (AR) is higher when the client size is bigger and when there’s more complexity included 
in the audit. Audit risk is basically the risk that auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when 
the financial statements are materially misstated. (See e.g. Eilifsen et al. 2014) For keeping audit risk 
at tolerable level, it requires more testing from auditors when the client is large and complex (i.e. 
risky), thus, the effort increases. That is why all factors can be seen to be attached to risk in the end, 
and therefore influencing audit fee through increased effort. 
 
Consequently, risks can be seen as major influencers on audit fees. Auditor must consider risks in 
every step during the audit, from the client acceptance to the final auditor report. Every risk factor 
must be identified, as well as the possibility of actualized risk. After proper risk assessment, the 
estimated risk level determines first the appropriate audit procedures, and then the final audit fee 
level. Typically, auditors use certain formula, known as audit risk model (ARM), to assess the risk: 
 
Audit Risk (AR) = Risk of Material Misstatement (RMM) * Detection Risk (DR) 
 
where Risk of Material Misstatement (RMM) times Detection Risk (DR) results Audit Risk (AR). 
RMM indicate the risk that auditee’s financial statements are misstated to a material degree, and it 
can be further divided into two components: Inherent Risk (IR) and Control Risk (CR). Inherent risk 
means that there’s possible, material misstatement in an account or disclosure, and it is due either 
error or fraud. Control risk in turn means that if this kind of misstatement occurs, it will not be 
prevented, detected and corrected by the entity’s internal control. Hence, these form the risk that there 
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is a material misstatement in financial reports, and they are affecting from client’s side. Detection 
risk on the other hand is depending on auditor’s behavior, when it basically means the risk that 
procedures performed by auditor will not detect a misstatement that exists. (Eilifsen et al. 2014; 
Hogan & Wilkins 2008; Chang et al. 2008; Houston et al. 1999) The alternative presentation for audit 
risk model is then following:  
 
Audit Risk (AR) = (Inherent Risk (IR) * Control Risk (CR)) * Detection Risk (DR) 
 
What is worth noticing for, is that RMM and DR has an inverse relationship, which means that the 
higher the RMM, the lower the DR must be. For example, if the auditor evaluates client’s inherent 
and control risk (i.e. RMM) to be high, it means that the auditor believes internal control to be at poor 
level, and that there’s great possibility for misstatement that could also be material. That is why the 
detection risk must be at low level, in order to retain the audit risk level (AR) at acceptable level. Low 
detection risk means that auditor cannot give any space for the possibility that they will not notice if 
material misstatement exists. For that reason, they must conduct greater amount of substantive testing, 
which means the most accurate testing methods, where actual entries, contracts etc. are examined. 
This is for ensuring that material misstatements do not occur, or at least they are detected on time.  
Hence, the lower the detection risk, the more effort audit requires. (Eilifsen et al. 2014; Hogan & 
Wilkins 2008) 
 
“Both inherent risk and control risk are documented by the auditor on the basis 
of an assessment of the client. In order to maintain overall audit risk at an 
acceptable level in the face of high inherent risk and / or control risk, auditors 
must reduce detection risk. Detection risk is reduced by increasing substantive 
testing.”. (Hogan & Wilkins 2008, 221) 
 
The audit risk model is not intended to be a precise formula that includes all factors affecting the 
assessment of audit fee, but it captures the basic logic behind planning and scoping of the audit. It 
helps auditors to assess the adequate level of different audit procedures, because risk levels – 
especially detection risk level – determines how much testing must be done within an audit. This in 
turn determines the final audit fee level in terms of required effort. When considering appropriate 
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detection risk level, it starts from assessing the desired audit risk level. Typically this is set as very 
low or low.  (See e.g. Eilifsen et al. 2014.) After this, auditor decides what is the risk of materia l 
misstatement based on research and tests on client. When these two elements are determined, the 
equation can be solved for getting the level of detection risk. (Houston et al. 1999, 284) By solving 
the audit risk model, auditors can determine the needed amount of substantive testing. Substantive 
tests are a way to gather evidence, because in order to form an opinion that financial statements are 
not materially misstated, auditor must gather sufficient amount of evidence about client’s assertions . 
Substantive tests are most common way to do that, and detection risk level determines the amount for 
this testing.  
 
 “This model (audit risk model) expresses the general relationship of audit risk 
and the risk associated with the auditor’s assessments of risk of material 
misstatement (inherent risk and control risk) and the risks that substantive tests 
will fail to detect a material misstatement in a relevant assertion (detection risk).” 
(Eilifsen et al. 2014, 97) 
 
In Eilifsen et al. (2014, 143) book, evidence gathering and factors affecting to it are illustrated with 
so called ‘assurance bucket’ (Figure 1). The bucket must be filled with evidence for achieving the 
desired assurance level to support the auditor’s opinion. The filling starts by risk assessment 
procedures, where risk levels for audit risk and risk of material misstatement are tentative ly 
determined. After assessing AR and RMM, auditor must test client’s controls for ensuring that IR and 
CR are evaluated right, and for getting the final level of control risk. This happens on second level. 
After this is done, audit risk model can be solved for getting the final detection risk level. As said 
above, this risk level is directive and most important factor when considering how much evidence 
must be gathered, that is, how much substantive testing should be done. So, after first two levels, 
auditor performs substantive procedures based on assessed risks and results from control testing. 
Better risk profile and control efficiency means less substantive testing for auditors. Substantive 
procedures include analytical procedures as well as test of details, and they are performed in that 
order.  
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Figure 1. The Assurance Bucket  
 
 
Third level in the bucket is thus substantive analytical procedures, which basically means that 
assertion is tested with analytical tools, not with test of details. For example, rent expenses are audited 
by inspecting rental contract, not by inspecting every invoice from each month. Thus, analytica l 
procedures take less time and effort, but may also be less accurate. After this comes the test of details 
which means actual sample testing, reviewing invoices, contracts, inventory and so on. Although test 
of details is often seen as most visible part in auditor’s work, it is actually the last phase when 
achieving desired assurance. The amount of evidence gathered from test of details is just enough to 
fill the bucket, and with some assertions, there’s no need for detail testing at all, when with some 
assertions the bucket may be primarily filled with test of details. Usually the more risk assertion 
includes, the more detail testing is required, when it gives least room for professional judgment and 
subjectivity. It is therefore the most accurate method for gathering evidence, but at the same time it 
is the most time-consuming method as well. (Eilifsen et al. 2014) 
 
To summarize, main factors affecting audit fee level from client side are size of the customer, 
complexity of an audit as well as the client’s riskiness. These all affect the amount of needed audit 
work which in turn heightens the audit fee, if increased. This stems from evidence gathering, where 
auditors must gather sufficient amount of evidence to be able to form opinion of client’s financ ia l 
statements. Auditors must gather more evidence if the size, complexity or the riskiness of the client 
increases. There are several ways to gather evidence, but usually it begins with risk assessment 
 
Eilifsen et al. (2014) pp.143 
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procedures and ends with substantive testing. Risks are in fact the most important factor behind audit 
fee pricing, when they can be seen linked to client size and complexity as well. Auditors should 
therefore consider risks throughout the whole audit from client acceptance to final opinion. Audit risk 
model is designed to help auditors to assess all these relevant risks, and adjusting their evidence 
gathering based on detection risk. Therefore, risk assessment procedure is seen as first and most 
important phase when performing the audit. However, the final opinion cannot be given before 
adequate amount of evidence is achieved through control testing and substantive testing, in addition 
to risk assessment procedures. 
 
 
2.2 Auditor dependent factors  
 
As was with client dependent factors, risks are also part of the factors affecting audit fees from the 
auditor’s side. When conducting an audit, auditors try to prevent audit risk (AR) from actualizing. 
However, reason why this concerns auditors is not the audit risk alone, but also the reputation risk, 
that stems from audit risk. This means that if client’s financial reports are materially misstated and 
auditor do not notice this, it will affect their reputation and liability, which in turn may weaken their 
financial position. In fact, the existence of reputation risk often guides auditor’s behavior and prevents 
them to please the management and act optimistic. (Uang et al. 2006, 790). Arthur Andersen is an 
example of actualized reputation risk, when the bankrupt was due mainly because of reputation loss. 
“Eventually, Arthur Andersen was found guilty of obstruction of justice only for destroying 
documents related to the Enron audit, and even though this decision was later overturned by the 
United States Supreme Court, it was already made AA to collapse. (Collins, 2016).  In addition to 
audit risk and reputation risk, there’s also auditor’s business risk, where auditor is exposed to loss or 
injury to professional practice from events arising in connection with financial statements audited and 
reported on. For example, auditor may be sued by the client even though audit is conducted in 
accordance with auditing standards. (Eilifsen et al. 2014, 97) Auditors must consider these risks and 
ask for fee that compensate them. However, from auditor perspective, this also means that risk and 
return go hand in hand. For that reason, audit firms must define their risk profile, and determine how 
much risk they are willing to take for corresponding return. Small audit firm may be more willing to 
engage risky clients, when expected profits are at much higher level. Thus, there may be differences 
in risk profiles between different sized audit firms.  
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What then comes to auditor size, as was with client size, also here there is both increasing and 
decreasing factors. For instance, big audit firms have more resources available, which means that they 
are usually able to enhance and organize their operations in a way, that maximize their efficiency. 
They don’t have to decline clients because of lack of resources, and often there is economies of scale 
that they can exploit. These aspects tend to decrease the audit fee level. Bigger audit firms are neither 
depending on one, major client unlike smaller ones may be. According to Gul (1991,163) for example , 
smaller auditors may be more dependent on a particular client than larger audit firms, because the 
client's fees are likely to be a larger proportion of a small audit firm's sales than of a large audit firm's 
sales. Also, bigger audit firms usually have more expertise to offer than smaller ones do, which in 
turn may increase the fee. According to Francis (2004, 352): “A higher audit fee implies higher audit 
quality, ceteris paribus, either through more audit effort (more hours) or through greater expertise of 
the auditor (higher billing rates)”. Additionally, bigger audit firms have also their reputation to 
protect, and therefore client’s risks may increase the fee. According to Uang et al. (2006, 795), larger 
audit firms are more vulnerable for reputational loss because of their high profile and ‘deep pockets’.  
 
When larger audit firms, BIG4-firms especially, have lot of resources and expertise, there have been 
suggestions of so called ‘BIG4-premium’, where these firms are in position where they are able to 
price their audit fees higher than non-BIG4 auditors. There are several studies that have examined 
this phenomenon, but the results are somewhat contradictory. According to Choi et al. (2008, 55):  
“ - - studies have provided mixed evidence on the existence and magnitude of a fee premium 
associated with audits performed by Big 4 (previously Big 5, 6, or 8).” Francis and Simon (1987) 
among many others have studied audit pricing and its connection to auditor’s size, as well as to 
client’s size. According to them, there’s no significant association between audit fees and audit firm 
size, if the client and the auditor are both big. However, they found that when the auditor belonged 
in BIG8-group2 and when the client was small, there was a significant association. That is, the bigger 
the auditor, and the smaller the auditee, the bigger the relative fee. Hence, Francis and Simon found 
a BIG8-premium, but only for smaller clients. They also suggested that reasons behind BIG8-
premium are coming from product differentiation (i.e. better audit quality) and scale of economics : 
“Big Eight price premium for small auditees, coupled with the absence of an observed price premium 
for large auditees, suggests an audit market in which there is Big Eight product differentiation and in 
                                                 
2 The Big Eight firms at the time (1987) were: Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, Coopers and Lybrand, Deloitte Haskins 
and Sells, Ernst and Whinney, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse, and Touche Ross. 
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which there are either Big Eight scale economies for large auditees or diseconomies of scale for the 
non-Big Eight in the audits of large auditees.” (Francis & Simon 1987, 148-156).  
 
There are also similar results from other authors, whose studies did find significant positive 
association between auditor’s size and audit fee levels, when the auditor is big, but when the auditee 
is small. (Francis, 1984; Francis & Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986). For example, Palmrose (1986, 
108-109) used approach where she compared pricing across small and large auditees and got similar 
result than Francis and Simon. She found that BIG8-coefficient was positive and statistica lly 
significant for small auditees but not for large. Although these studies are rather old, they get support 
from more recent studies, such as Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic’s study from year 2008. According to 
them, there truly is BIG4-premium, but only what comes to small clients: “The coefficient on BIG4, 
which captures the magnitude of Big 4 premium, is significantly positive for small and medium-s ize 
strata at less than the 1 percent level, but it is not significantly different from zero for the large-size 
stratum. In other words, the Big 4 premium exists only for small and medium-size client segments. ” 
(Choi et al. 2008, 84). Studies are also in line with general assumption, where smaller firms pay 
relatively more audit fees than bigger firms do. This is however argued more thoroughly with 
hypothesis development in Chapter 4 and examined empirically in Chapter 6.   
 
There are few other factors that have also impact on audit fees, but they are not directly linked to risks 
or auditor’s size. First, the competitive situation on the market naturally affects audit fees. The lack 
of competition may lead for increased prices, if BIG4 auditors ask for premium over their prices and 
there’s no competition to reduce this. Among BIG4 auditors there could also be cartel-like behavior, 
when there’s only four audit firms that conduct majority of the audits, and when they are often only 
choice for public companies for example. On the other hand, strict competition among auditors may 
decrease prices, when every operator in the market try to engage new clients, and at the same time 
keep the old ones. “Competition has also been linked to size of audit fee since high competit ion 
increases the chances of losing a client and hence revenue." (Gul 1991, 163).  Also, the persuasion 
for new clients is often done by decreasing prices, sometimes even below costs. This is known as 
‘lowballing’. According to O’Keefe’s et al. (1994), especially when auditors bid to perform a new 
engagement, it can lead to lowballing. In addition to competitive situation, any additional regulat ion 
usually affects audit fee levels also. For instance, SOX had massive impact on auditors’ requirements , 
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which should very likely to be visible as an increase in audit fees in the beginning of 21st century. 
This is examined in Chapter 6 as well.  
 
The final factor affecting audit fee from auditor’s side is the auditor tenure, which basically means 
the number of years an auditor is retained by the firm. Lowballing and expertise can be seen to linked 
to auditor tenure as well. According to Gul et al. (2009, 265) prior studies suggest that auditors with 
short tenure had lower audit fees because auditor has used lowballing when trying to engage this 
client, and also because the lack of customer specific knowledge in the beginning of clientship. In 
addition to this, also learning curve depends on auditor tenure. Learning curve means that at the 
beginning of client engagement, the client is new to the auditor, and that is why it takes more time 
and effort to audit the client for the first time. However, as the tenure continues, auditor will learn 
more and more about its business environment, operations and internal control, and therefore the audit 
becomes more efficient after first few years. Thus, learning curve arises when client specific 
knowledge increases. According to Tanyi et al. (2008, 674): “- - effective audits require a thorough 
understanding of the client’s business and processes; such understanding develops over time and there 
is a steep learning curve that lasts a year or more.” Usually learning lowers the audit fee when 
efficiency is enhanced, but at the same time increases it, when client-specific knowledge increases. 
However, what should be noted when discussing learning curve is that SOX requires mandatory 
auditor rotation every five years. According to Raiborn et al. (2006), this increases remarkably the 
risk of audit failure in the initial years of an audit engagement because of lack of familiarity with the 
new client: “In all instances of relationship change, there is a high potential for misunderstand ing, 
uncertainty, and ambiguity.” (Raiborn et al. 2006, 41).  
 
To summarize, although main factors affecting audit fee levels are coming from the side of the client, 
there are also several aspects that have impact on audit fees from the auditor’s side as explained here. 
These however are seen to have less impact than client dependent factors, when these factors are often 
conditional on markets, regulators, competitive situation etc. and they are also not that easily 
measurable. For that reason, client’s size, complexity, and risks are still considered as main factors 
affecting audit fees. Next, example of basic audit fee pricing model is introduced, where most of the 
factors presented above are included in the model.  
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2.3. Audit fee pricing model  
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, it is important to understand basic logic behind audit 
fee pricing and factors affecting it. However, there’s no single model that would be generally accepted 
and used when defining audit fee level. There are several models available that are designed to take 
into account factors listed above, but they may differ noticeably from each other. Additionally, every 
client has its own aspects that effect auditor’s work, and it is impossible to include them all in one, 
general model. However, most typical factors that are measurable are usually involved. For example, 
Francis and Simon (1987) created audit fee pricing model that is based on a cross-sectional regression 
of audit fees on a set of explanatory variables. This model was selected here, because it describes 
comprehensively different factors affecting audit fee level, while at the same time remaining rather 
simple. The model explains basic logic behind audit fee pricing with multiple regression analys is, 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fee. The pricing model is following: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐹𝐸𝐸 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝑏2 𝑆𝑄𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆 +  𝑏3 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 +  𝑏4 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶
+ 𝑏5𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁 +  𝑏6 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅 +  Ꜫ 
 
where:  
𝑏0 = intercept value 
LOGASSETS = natural logarithm of total assets 
SQSUBS = square root of the number of consolidated subsidiaries 
FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries 
INVREC = the proportion of assets in inventories and receivables 
OPINION= a dummy variable having a value of 1 if the firm received a "subject to" audit opinion 
AUDITOR = a dummy variable for auditor size, e.g. having value 1 if the auditor is in BIG4 and 0 
otherwise 
Ꜫ = residual error term  
 
The first explanatory variable is logarithm of total assets. This tries to capture client size factor, when 
usually amount of total assets in balance sheet gives direction of company’s size. Second variable is 
square root of the number of consolidated subsidiaries. This is for complexity, but also for size factor, 
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when large number of subsidiaries usually means larger company size. Also, the more subsidiar ies, 
the more complex processes and structure inside the organisation. The third explanatory variable 
considers also complexity, when it is the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiar ies. 
Always when the company operates at foreign regions, it increases the complexity of an audit when 
it requires additional expertise from auditor in terms of regulation and tax legislation at least. Fourth 
and fifth variables in turn are linked to client risk. Variable INVREC stands for the proportion of 
assets in inventories and receivables. These are usually defined as risk items, when there are only 
income expectations, not actual income. For instance, inventory value may include subjective 
estimates, and even though it would be valued based on lowest-value principle, it may still be 
overvalued. Also, there’s always risk that auditee is not able to realize the value of its inventory if 
needed, and with receivables, there is always risk of bad dept. The fifth variable is a dummy variable 
considering previous audit opinion. The variable is having value of 1 if the firm received a "subject 
to" audit opinion and value 0 otherwise. This is naturally related to risk, when there is remarkable 
uncertainty if the auditor was not able to give standard audit report previously. The last variable 
besides residual error term Ꜫ is the dummy variable AUDITOR. It naturally indicates auditor size, and 
it can be divided into BIG4-variable and non-BIG4 variable for example. With these variables, it is 
possible to investigate whether smaller audit firms ask higher prices or does BIG4-premium exists. 
 
According to Francis and Simon, all these variables are expected to be positively related to audit fees. 
Hence, even though in some cases smaller firm size may mean relatively more effort from auditors 
and therefore increase the audit fee level, the general assumption is that size and fees are positive ly, 
not negatively associated. Besides, even though this model is designed over thirty years ago, it still 
manages to capture the basic reasons behind audit fee pricing: client size, complexity, risks and 
auditor size. By running this regression model to certain data, the magnitude of coefficient  𝑏𝑥  would 
tell the given weight for different explanatory variables, that is, what factors have been seen having 
most impact on audit fees, and what have been given less weight. In Francis and Simon’s study, 
variable FOREIGN had highest coefficient of 0.52, while the second highest was LOGASSETS. These 
results indicate that the factor increasing audit fees by the most was complexity coming from foreign 
subsidiaries, and after that, the client size had second largest impact. (Francis & Simon 1987, 152) 
This introduction of different factors affecting audit fees and the basic model for audit fee pricing 
should give a general understanding of aspects behind audit fees. Next, the quality of an audit is 
brought in, when clients usually demand adequate quality in return for price, and audit fee level and 
audit quality are often seen to be in connection.   
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3. AUDIT QUALITY 
 
Audit quality can be seen as certain type measure for audits, ranging from very low to very high audit 
quality. Yet, it is difficult to measure what is the actualized level of audit quality, because the only 
observable outcome of the audit is the audit report, which is a generic template and majority of these 
are standard clean opinions. One common way to measure audit quality is to review audit failure 
rates. An audit failure occurs when generally accepted accounting principles are not enforced by the 
auditor (GAAP failure), or when an auditor fails to issue a modified or qualified audit report in the 
appropriate circumstances (audit report failure). In both cases, the audited financial statements are  
potentially misleading users. (Francis 2004.) Besides the measurement of audit quality, it is also hard 
to assess what is the adequate level for that. If both audit fee and audit quality are high, is too much 
invested in audits? “However, we do not know from research the optimal level of audit quality and 
therefore whether we currently have ‘too little’ or ‘too much’ auditing?” (Francis 2004, 345-346.) It 
is also worth asking for whether audit fees compensate the quality level, especially if audit fees are 
substantially high. Next, factors affecting audit quality are introduced, and after that the role, as well 
as the adequate level of audit quality, are considered.  
 
 
3.1 Factors associated to audit quality 
 
Several studies suggest that audit fees, auditor tenure and auditor’s expertise have positive association 
to audit quality. This means that higher fees indicate higher effort and better expertise, and that longer 
tenure increases the efficiency and lowers the audit failure risk. Hence, the audit quality increases.  
However, there are also suggestions whether the level of audit fees affects negatively to the audit 
quality, when auditor’s independence, objectivity and skepticism can become endangered  (see e.g. 
DeAngelo 1981). According to Hoitash et al. (2007), fees paid to auditors can affect audit quality in 
two ways: large fees paid to auditors may increase the effort exerted by auditors and by that increase 
the audit quality. Alternatively, large fees paid to auditors, particularly those that are related to non-
audit services (NAS), can make auditors more economically dependent on their clients. Such financ ia l 
reliance may encourage a relationship where the auditor becomes unwilling to make appropriate 
inquiries during the audit for fear of losing highly profitable fees.  (Hoitash et al. 2007, 762) 
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Thus, the main concern regarding audit fees’ association to audit quality is the loss of auditor’s 
independence, and this is especially emphasized with non-audit services. “Audit quality will always 
be somewhat suspect if other services are provided that are perceived to potentially compromise the 
auditor’s objectivity and skepticism." (Francis 2004, 345). Choi et al. (2010) found a negative 
association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality, but this was with fees, that are clearly at 
higher level than expected (positive abnormal fees). Conversely, Craswell et al. (2001), didn’t find 
association between audit fees and decreased auditor independence. Neither did Lim and Tan (2008), 
who studied particularly the association of non-audit service fees to audit quality. Frankel et al. (2002) 
on the other hand found evidence that auditor independence is compromised when clients pay high 
non-audit fees relative to total fees. Gunny et al. (2007, 30), found that with non-BIG4 auditors, audit 
fees and total fees, especially abnormal ones, enhanced the likelihood of audit failures, but non-audit 
fees not. Thus, these contradictory results suggest that high amount of audit fees or non-audit fees do 
not indicate good audit quality directly, but it cannot be interpreted as a quality-reducing factor either 
without further investigation. 
 
When considering positive association between audit fees and audit quality, it would mean that higher 
audit fee indicates good audit quality. This phenomenon is familiar from basic commercia l 
environment, where high quality product is more expensive than product with lower quality. With 
audits, the basic assumption is that auditees are not willing to pay large audit fees whether the quality 
is not at adequate level. Conversely, auditors are not able to ask high price if their audit quality does 
not meet with all the requirements. Hoitash et al. (2007) found a positive and significant association 
between total fees and different variables describing the audit quality between years 2000-2003. 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) examined especially non-audit fees, and they didn’t find association at all 
between non-audit fees and variables that described audit quality. Thus, all these mixed results 
indicate that there’s no clear outcome whether the amount of fees paid to auditors affects audit quality 
or not. There are results that suggest positive association between fees and quality, but there are also 
results that indicate negative association, which means that fees impair independence and therefore 
the audit quality as well. Especially with NAS-fees, the general assumption has been that they are the 
main problem when considering auditor independence. However, some results suggest that there are 
situations where NAS-fees do not impair audit quality and in some cases even improves it, when 
auditor is more committed to auditee.  
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In addition to fees, auditor tenure is also seen as audit quality indicator. Majority of the studies 
considering auditor tenure suggest that auditor tenure has not negative association to audit quality.  
(See e.g. Ghosh & Moon 2006; Gul et al. 2009; Johnson et al. 2002; Francis 2004; Myers et al. 2003.)  
Moreover, results indicate that it has positive impact on quality, when the client expertise increases 
year by year, which in turn reduces the possibility of audit failure. “We do not find that long audit 
firm tenures are associated with a decline in financial reporting quality. -- However, we did find a 
significant decline in financial reporting quality associated with short audit firm tenures.” (Johnson 
et al. 2002, 655). Myers et al. (2003) got similar results, when they got positive association between 
audit quality and tenure as well. They also raised the question of SOX’s mandatory auditor rotation, 
when studies suggest that audit firm changes rather decrease the audit quality than increase it, like 
was with Johnson et al. study. “Specifically, our results suggest that under the current system, 
increased auditor tenure does not lead to reduced audit and earnings quality. If deteriorating earnings 
and/or audit quality are the motivation for calls for mandatory rotation, then our results do not support 
such an argument.” (Myers et al. 2003, 796). According to Francis (2004, 357), although the 
mandatory auditor rotation was created because of Enron and other similar scandals and for 
improving the quality of audits, the evidence does not support the need for, or the benefit of 
mandatory auditor rotation. Hence, all these authors are questioning SOX’s regulation considering 
mandatory auditor rotation.  
 
Third and last factor considering audit quality is the auditor’s expertise. General assumption is that 
the more auditor knows about its client and client’s industry, the better the quality of an audit will be. 
“There is also evidence that audited financial statements are of higher quality when audited by an 
industry expert." (Francis 2004, 355) and: “- - audit quality depends on numerous factors includ ing 
an auditor’s knowledge and understanding of the company being audited and the industry in which it 
operates” (Gul et al. 2009, 267).  The reason for better audit quality according to Gul et al. is that 
auditors with industry expertise are more likely to detect misrepresentations and irregularities than 
auditors without industry expertise, especially in the early years of the audit assignment. What comes 
to tenure and expertise with non-BIG4 audit firms, Gunny et al. (2007, 30) found that also there the 
auditor tenure and industry expertise had a favorable impact on audit quality by mitigating audit and 
serious deficiencies. Unlike with fees, the results considering tenure and expertise are clearer, and 
majority of studies support assumptions that both factors have a positive impact on audit quality.  
Ironically, SOX has restricted both of these; tenure by mandatory audit rotation, and expertise by 
restricting tenure, and prohibiting providence of certain non-audit services.  
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However, when considering expertise, the question of auditor’s size comes up inevitably. In general, 
it is believed that BIG4-auditors are able to offer more expertise than auditors outside of BIG4, hence 
audits conducted by BIG4 are of better quality. “This implies that, ceteris paribus, the larger the 
auditor as measured by the number of current clients and the smaller the client as a fraction of the 
auditor's total quasi-rents, the less incentive the auditor has to behave opportunistically, and the higher 
the perceived quality of the audit.” (DeAngelo 1981, 197). However, as DeAngelo pointed out, the 
size of a client matters also. If substantial proportion of an audit firm’s total revenue comes from a 
particular client, it may endanger auditor’s independence, when the audit firm may be less willing to 
exert influence on client reporting choices (Chambers & Payne 2011; Francis & Yu 2009). Yet, 
usually one larger client does not have remarkable status as a client when the auditor is also big. 
Therefore, there may be increased possibility to impaired independence especially when the auditor 
is small, but the auditee big.  
 
Sometimes there can also be situation where only BIG4 firms can offer certain expertise considering 
tax legislation for example, and then there’s no other choice for the client than select auditor from 
BIG4-group. At the same time, this audit firm gets advantage in price discussions, when they have 
demanded expertise. In Ferguson et al. study (2003, 430) it was stated that: “In both the firm-wide 
and office-level perspectives, the assumption is that some clients demand a higher level of industry 
expertise from their auditor and are willing to pay a premium for the expertise.” According to Francis 
(2004, 353), there’s also other evidence that support expectation where BIG4 firms have better quality 
audits: “Big 4 firms are sued relatively less frequently after controlling for clientele size, and Big 4 
firms are sanctioned less frequently by the Securities and Exchange Commission.“ (See also Palmrose 
1988). The difference between larger and smaller audit firms was observable even inside the BIG4-
auditor group, when Francis & Yu found a systematic association between BIG4 office size and audit 
outcomes consistent with larger offices producing higher quality audits. (Francis & Yu 2009, 1549). 
Therefore, results suggest that the bigger the audit firm, the more there are expertise and resources, 
and then the quality of an audit improves. Better quality audit in turn is reason for higher audit fee. 
 
After reviewing different factors affecting audit quality, auditor tenure and expertise are seen to have 
positive association on audit quality in general. However, it seems that results considering fees are 
diverse, and conclusions of audit quality cannot be made directly based on fee level. One explanation 
for this could be, that better expertise usually increases the fee, but longer tenure decreases it. Better 
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expertise and longer tenure have positive association to audit quality, but only one of these raises the 
fee. It was also argued that positive association between fees and quality comes from increased effort, 
but if the auditor tenure is remained for a long time, it doesn’t essentially increase the effort. Because 
of learning curve, the effort rather decreases than increases when the tenure continues. It is also worth 
noticing for, that due learning curve, longer tenure increases the client specific expertise as well. This 
means that all these factors associated to audit quality are connected to each other, and direct 
conclusions of their impact is hard to make. In addition, studies usually measure audit quality 
differently, when it is challenging to determine what variables describe audit quality best, and what 
is high quality audit versus low quality audit. These aspects emphasize the difficulty regarding 
measurement of audit quality, and why there are debates whether the audit quality is at acceptable 
level or not. In the beginning of 21st century, the general belief was that audit quality is diminished 
too much, and therefore additional regulation came into force. However, as already mentioned above, 
researchers suggest that the new regulation was either unnecessary or excessive. In next section, this 
aspect will be considered more carefully.  
 
 
3.2 The role of audit quality 
 
When the audit quality can act as a measure for audits, the role of audit quality is undoubtedly 
important. Yet, when the quality of an audit is so difficult to measure, how do we know when there 
is adequate amount of audit quality? Accounting scandals such as Enron and Arthur Andersen 
implied, that there isn’t enough regulation considering audit quality, and that something had to be 
done for restoring markets’ trust. For that reason, SOX as well as PCAOB were formed. “-- many of 
the provisions of SOX were directed toward improving audit quality by increasing auditor 
independence, specifically the ban on non-audit services and the implementation of a direct 
communication channel with the audit committee allowing auditors to bypass management in their 
discussions of potentially contentious financial reporting and control issues.” (Chambers & Payne 
2011, 441). However, some researchers say that SOX has unnecessary parts which do not serve their 
initial purpose, and that there was no problem to begin with. Francis (2004), Myers (2003) and 
Johnson (2002) all reported that auditor tenure do not reduce audit quality because auditor’s 
independence is not endangered when the tenure continues. They in fact reported that longer tenure 
has a positive association to audit quality, because it improves client expertise. This raises questions 
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whether mandatory auditor rotation is actually harmful, when the quality seems to decrease when the 
auditor must be changed. That would be the opposite purpose of the regulation.  
 
Additionally, also concerns regarding non-audit services seemed to be excessive, when there are no 
clear results whether high non-audit fee level automatically decreases the audit quality. For example. 
Kinney et al. (2004, 563) studied audit quality trough audit report restatements: “The regulators’ and 
legislators’ reasoning suggests the existence of a positive association between NAS fees and 
restatements, and particularly lucrative NAS fees. Yet, we know of no systematically obtained 
empirical evidence from before the SEC and Congressional actions that documents a positive 
association between NAS fees and restatements.” When there are concerns whether SOX has limited 
auditors’ ability to operate unreasonably, it is worth asking for if SOX regulation did improve the 
audit quality or not. Chambers and Payne (2011) examined audit quality post-SOX within BIG4-audit 
firms, and they found that audit quality improved after all when measured by the quality of accruals. 
They also found that the quality improved especially among auditors, that were classified having low 
independence, that is, they were seen to be at least partly depended on their clients, and therefore 
willing to make adjustments in audit. These results therefore suggest that SOX was able to improve 
the audit quality and thus achieved its main objective. However, there are several limitations in this 
study, when e.g. direct data of audit fees were not available, and therefore fees were derived from 
sales. In addition to this, also the examination period was rather short after the SOX came into force, 
when the last year examined was 2007.  
 
This uncertainty around audit quality raises concern whether the whole audit concept is overrated. Is 
there too much audits with too much of an audit quality with too high audit fees? According to Francis 
(2004, 345): -- outright audit failure rates are infrequent, far less than 1% annually, and audit fees are 
quite small, less than 0.1% of aggregate client sales. This suggests there may be an acceptable level 
of audit quality at a relatively low cost.” However, the costs and benefits of an audit should also be 
reviewed, because if SOX conducted some improvements on audit quality, were they bigger than 
costs arising from it? “However, in evaluating audit quality it is important to assess both the benefits 
and costs of auditing. For example, while audit failure rates are low, if audit fees are large, it is 
possible that too much investment is being made in audit quality relative to the benefits achieved .” 
(Francis 2004, 348).  Iliev’s study from year 2010 suggested, that when considering especially smaller 
firms, SOX didn’t have any, or only remote benefits when considering audit quality. He got strong 
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empirical evidence that especially section 404 compliance (internal control) led to a significant 
increase in costs and lower discretionary earnings. Thus, according to Iliev, these results are 
consistent with the view that SOX Section 404 proved to be too costly especially for small firms, and 
that costs exceeded benefits. (Iliev 2010, 1193) This was pointed out already in previous chapter, 
when proper arrangement of internal control is more difficult and expensive for smaller clients. 
Because of these aspects together with research results that do not support tenure and NAS restricts, 
the final conclusion of SOX’s benefits remains unclear. Audit quality’s role is to secure stakeholders’ 
position, act as a measure for an audit and reduce information asymmetry, but when audit is primarily 
an assurance service, how much auditors can ask for it? In addition, benefits from an audit and 
importance of an audit quality is extremely difficult to assess, especially when audit reports are based 
on generic template, and they are also published together with other financial statements. Therefore, 
it is challenging to investigate whether investors’ reactions for instance were due of auditor report, or 
due of other information received at the same time.  
 
Although previous studies got mixed results regarding audit quality, and despite the fact that audit is 
plain assurance service and conducted only annually, it can be argued that audit has some kind of 
value creation power. Even though it has mandatory nature, it makes investors and other stakeholders 
to trust financial statements more. Financial reports are a principal means of communicating financ ia l 
information to those outside an entity, and audits by a third party can enhance the quality of the 
financial information by reducing information asymmetry and conflicts of interest. Hence, one of the 
main objectives for audit is to reduce information asymmetry between the client and its stakeholders, 
and therefore increase the creditability. (See e.g. Johnson et al. 2002; Eilifsen et al. 2014; Eisenhard t 
et al. 1989). According to Francis (2004, 353), this is also one of the main reasons why auditees are 
willing to pay more for better quality audits. According to him, especially firms with greater 
monitoring needs due higher agency costs are more likely to use BIG4-auditors and pay excessive 
prices. This is most visible with public companies when their agency costs are usually the highest, 
and for that reason they tend to choose auditor from BIG4-group. Thus, auditees truly believe that 
better audit quality increases their creditability towards stakeholders, and that BIG4 firm offer the 
best quality what comes to audits. (See also Beatty 1989.) These results suggest that audits are not 
overrated, when auditees see them beneficial. They also seem to appreciate good audit quality, when 
they are willing to pay premium for better quality audits. Therefore, improvements considering audit 
quality should benefit both sides.  
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“Why do firms voluntarily pay more for a higher quality audit when lower priced 
and legal alternatives exist? -- Firms with greater inherent uncertainty (and 
greater information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders) have an incentive 
to communicate their intrinsic quality by hiring a more credible, high-quality 
auditor.” (Francis 2004, 353) 
 
To summarize, fees related to audit, auditor tenure as well as auditor’s expertise affect the quality of 
an audit. However, it is not clear whether these have a positive or negative impact on quality, and 
research results around this topic are somewhat mixed. In addition, there’s no consensus how to 
measure audit quality, or even what is the adequate level of that. Because of several scandals in the 
beginning of 21st century, regulators start to question whether the audit quality was at too low level, 
and for improving audit quality, SOX and PCAOB were formed. Still, there are several studies 
suggesting that the initial purpose of SOX is not achieved, when some of the regulation may rather 
decrease the audit quality than increase it. Furthermore, even though SOX would improve audit 
quality in a way, it should be carefully investigated whether costs arising from SOX compliance 
surpass the benefits. It is not clear to this day if the audit quality has improved post-SOX and what 
are the final costs of this regulation. SOX had enormous impact on accounting societies at least in the 
US., and even though audit fee rates were low in the beginning of 21st century according to Francis, 
it may not be the case a few decades later. The development of audit fees and acceptable level of 
them, in addition to effects arising from SOX, will be studied more closely in the rest of this study.  
 
“While audits are relatively inexpensive and the outright audit failure rate is low, 
when a corporate failure like Enron occurs there are enormous social and economic 
consequences. Despite this lack of knowledge, the new US audit requirements in 
Sarbanes-Oxley are expected to have a large impact on audit fees with expected 
increases of 50% or more; yet, we have no compelling reason to believe that audit 
quality will necessarily be improved or that audit failures will be significantly reduced 
by these more costly audits.” (Francis 2004, 361) 
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4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
When considering how auditing markets have act during the past 18 years, the general assumption 
would be that audit fees have risen during the 21st century. There are few clear reasons for that. First 
are the two major crises affecting accounting environment, first being the Enron and Arthur Andersen 
scandal in 2002, and second being the global financial crisis during 2007-2009, started by Lehman 
Brothers and US housing markets. In addition to these, new regulation has been introduced this 
millennium, when i.a Sarbanes-Oxley Act (U.S.) and BILL 198 (Canada) came into effect in 2002. 
These had admittedly massive effects on accounting societies in North America, when requirements 
for both – authors of the financial statements as well as the auditors reviewing those statements – 
increased remarkably. In addition, also the globalization has changed operational and financ ia l 
markets within the last decades, and the economic environment is thus more complicated than before.  
These all factors would support the assumption, that audit fees have increased during this millennium.   
 
However, there’s some evidence that audit fees have not increased during the past decade or so, and 
there have been even suggestions that fees have sometimes been too low, especially at the time when 
new engagements are formed. According to Hay (2017) for instance, there has been concerns among 
regulators and other stakeholders whether audit fees are excessively low. Especially ethical issues 
arise when there are concerns whether overall fees are adequate to perform a proper audit, whether 
audit firms are providing a competitive market, and whether there is ‘lowballing’ of new audit 
engagements. The Code of Ethics noted that the Fundamental Principle of professional competence 
is threatened if the audit fee is so low that it might be difficult to perform the engagement in 
accordance with applicable technical and professional standards. (Hay 2017, A4.) So, the major 
concern comes from low prices, where audit firms push their fee rate that low that they are no longer 
able to conduct the audit with adequate quality. This is usually result of price competition or price 
pressure, when audit firms decrease their fees in order to achieve new clients or for keeping the 
remaining ones. Price competition occurs usually then, when the objective is to get new engagements, 
but price pressure occurs then, when there’s pressure from the market to decrease the fees because of 
recession for example.  
 
 28 
Effects of price pressure should have occurred during The Great Recession, but effect of price 
competition should be visible especially from 2002 forward, when AA withdrew from the market. 
That time remaining audit firms would compete over AA’s clients, and the earlier mentioned 
lowballing should happen. However, there isn’t that much research results of low audit fees or 
lowballing, or the results are in dissonance. For example, Asthana et al. (2009) did interest ing 
findings, when in their study was found clear signs that when former Andersen clients switched to a 
BIG4 auditor, their fees went up by a statistically significant amount – not downwards that would be 
expected in case of lowballing. However, they also found that with same clients, there was evidence 
of lowballing, when BIG4 auditors did decrease their fees due of price competition. Yet, they 
discovered that even tough fees were reduced, there was still evidence of BIG4 premium. These 
results therefore suggest that remaining BIG4 in fact increased their prices for former AA clients, and 
that price competition decreased fees only remotely. (Asthana et. al. 2009, 7).  In Kohlbeck et.al study 
(2010), there were similar findings, when they reported that those clients that switched the Andersen 
audit team and changed it to another BIG4 auditor, paid a premium fee.  
 
“With the demise of Andersen, large multinational corporations saw the number 
of potential audit providers’ drop from five to four. Additionally, those four were 
inundated with former Andersen clients beginning in the spring of 2002. The 
lack of choice for existing clients means that auditors were able to push through 
price increases as audit fees were negotiated for 2001 and 2002 audits.” 
(Asthana et. al. 2009, 21) 
 
When there’s evidence of increased audit fees even at the time of new engagements, concerns about 
premium fees, and lack of competition because BIG4 auditors perform majority of all audits, it 
questions the assumption of low fees. Also, as studies above suggest, even though there could be 
reductions in audit fees in some situations, even then premium fees seem to appear. When considering 
these aspects and other evidence of low or decreased audit fees is only minor, the overruling 
assumption would be that audit fees have increased during the 21st century. For that reason, the initia l 
assumption is that the relative share of audit fees has increased. Hypothesis 1 is then following:  
 
H1: The ratio of audit fees to sales have increased over time. 
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This assumption is based on several factors which were briefly introduced in the beginning of this 
chapter. First was the Enron scandal occurring in 2002, where American energy company Enron went 
bankrupt, and their auditor, Arthur Andersen (AA), was accused of giving false audit opinions. 
According to New York Times (2002), Arthur Andersen auditors reviewed and approved transactions 
by Enron-related partnerships that contributed to the company's collapse. The general conclusion was 
that “despite Enron's poor accounting practices, AA offered its stamp of approval, signing the 
corporate reports for years” (Segal, 2018). This damaged noticeably the credibility of auditing 
markets and BIG5 auditors, in which AA at that time belonged. In addition to Enron case, also 
WorldCom and Tyco International scandals took place during 2002, which increased the market’s 
instability even more. This uncertainty in the markets and withdrawal of one BIG5 audit firm should 
be shown as an increase in audit fees. (See e.g. Gates et al. 2007, 5-6; Scott 2014, 8-9).  
 
The second reason why people would expect fees to increase is consequence of all above, because 
due i.a. Enron and Arthur Andersen scandal, United States federal law set expanded, as well as brand-
new requirements for all U.S. public company boards, management and public accounting firms. The 
new regulation was known as SOX (See Chapter 1). “Enron's collapse and the financial havoc it 
wreaked on its shareholders and employees led to new regulations and legislation to promote the 
accuracy of financial reporting for publicly held companies.” (Segal, 2018). Due SOX, requirements 
that remaining auditors faced extended remarkably, and auditors must had input more effort than 
before to reach acceptable audit quality. From auditor’s perspective, especially SOX’s section 404 
increased effort the most, when it requires that auditors pay far more attention on internal control, 
which is naturally very time-consuming. Internal control can’t be ensured by one test for example , 
and it takes lot of investigation for developing an understanding of internal controls, and after that, 
plenty of control testing. (Eilifsen et al. 2014; Scott 2014).  
 
“In 2004, the average amount of audit fees paid per $1 million of revenue increased 
from $403 to $592. This increase was due, in large part, to the requirements of Section 
404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX 404”), which required management to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls over financial reporting 
(IFCRs).” (Audit Analytics 2014) 
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The effects of SOX have been studied comprehensively. According to Audit Analytics’ research, the 
loss of the income from prohibited assignments in SOX forced auditors to shift the cost of risks 
included in those fees over to audit fees. In the same study, it was calculated that audit fees in relation 
to revenue increased by 46.97 percent in year 2004 when compared to prior year, mainly because of 
SOX. (Audit Analytics 2014, 3-5). In the same study, it was also shown that overall increase in audit 
fees between years 2002-2013 was over 30% when measured per million dollars in revenue. 
Raghunandan and Rama made a similar observation, when they found that audit fees were 86 percent 
higher in year 2004 than in year 2003 because of SOX. They also argued that this increase is 
surprisingly large, when internal controls were supposed to be audited even before SOX. In their 
opinion, auditors either started audit internal controls properly only after SOX, or there was noticeable 
increase in material weaknesses within companies only in year 2004, latter being highly unlike ly. 
Therefore, they suggested that SOX was the main factor behind fees’ increase. (Raghunandan & 
Rama 2006, 112). In their study the sample however was rather small, including only manufactur ing 
firms, which may explain why the percentage is much higher than with Audit Analytics study.  
 
In addition to SOX, also Dodd–Frank Act (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act) was introduced during examination period, when it came into force in July 2010. It was a 
comprehensive financial reform legislation, and it was created because of the financial crisis of 2008. 
Because of this, it was targeted to the sectors of the financial system that were believed to have caused 
the 2008 financial crisis, including banks, mortgage lenders, and credit rating agencies. Act included 
over 2,300 pages of new legislation, mainly different kinds of provisions, that should be implemented 
over a period of several years. This should be most likely visible in audit fee levels at that time, when 
new regulation creates always implement costs. Also, critics of the law argue that the regulatory 
burden could make United States firms less competitive than their foreign counterparts. For that 
reason, in year 2018, US congress passed a new law that rolled back some of Dodd-Frank's 
restrictions. (Kenton, 2019) Accordingly, massive amount of new regulation and added requirements 
should most likely increase the workload of auditors, which would eventually rise the audit fee level 
as well. 
 
Third and final reason why there is expectation of increased audit fees, is the reduced competit ion 
after BIG5 transformed to BIG4. When BIG5 was becoming BIG4 after Arthur Andersen’s 
withdrawal, there was sudden increase in demand for auditors that was able to audit large, public 
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companies. In year 2003, the last year that AA was active, the BIG5 covered around 73% of all audits 
in our data. During years 2000-2003 when AA still performed audits, it had around 7.3 percent share 
of all audits within the data. This means that after year 2003, around 7 percent of audits would be run 
through by some other audit firm – most likely by someone from the BIG4. Even though this change 
could create some lowballing among auditors when audit firms compete over former AA clients, the 
more powerful impact should be that sudden increase in demand and reduced supply at the same time 
should increase the prices. The lowballing could have decreased the fee levels at some level, but the 
increasing impact should be bigger, as Asthana et al. (2009) results suggested. Also, this situation 
should enable higher asking pricing when audit firms would have advantage in the fee negotiations.  
Hence, based on all this reasoning, the general assumption is that audit fees have increased over time.  
 
The second hypothesis considers audit fees by different deciles. Deciles are formed by dividing the 
data on ten equal size groups based on revenue. Decile 1 has the smallest revenue and Decile 10 the 
biggest. Based on previous studies, there’s an expectation that relative audit fees are higher when 
considering firms with smaller revenue. The most important research to express this behavior is J.R. 
Francis’ study from year 2004, where Francis examined audit quality in terms of audit’s benefits and 
costs. In the study, audit fees were considered as costs or as a “negative” side of an audit, and they 
were analyzed using 2002–2003 audit fee disclosure data for 5500 large publicly listed companies 
from the United States. In the study it was shown that audit fees in fact decreased with bigger deciles: 
“As expected, average fees as a percentage of sales decrease as firm size becomes larger. For the 
smallest decile, audit fees average 2% of sales, but for the largest decile audit fees average less than 
1/100 of one per cent of sales.” (Francis 2004, 348-349).  
 
The second study to support this presumption is made by Audit Analytics, where audit fees were also 
compared to revenue. However, now the comparison was made in dollars, not in percentages. 
According the study, in year 2013 total audit fees for smaller reporting companies (SRC) were $332 
million, when for larger firms this was around 8 billion. When this was compared to total sales of 
these groups, Audit Analytics’ researchers found that smaller firms paid relatively more. Even though 
audit fees for bigger firms were over 24 times greater in absolute value, the relative share of audit 
fees was bigger with SRC. The total revenue amount for SRC in year 2013 was $65.5 billion, 
compared to $16.9 trillion which was the revenue for bigger firms. When audit fees were divided by 
this revenue level, it was shown that smaller companies paid around $5,000 in audit fees (on average) 
 32 
for every $1 million in revenue, whereas larger companies paid only $479 for every $1 million in 
revenue. That is, smaller companies paid over 10 times more audit fees in relation to sales. (Audit 
Analytics 2014). 
 
Besides results from previous studies, there’s also other factors that support assumption where bigger 
firms pay relatively less audit fees. This also relates to client size which was discussed in previous 
chapters. First one is that larger firms benefit more from price pressure and price competition, when 
they are vital customers for audit firms. Also, especially during economic depression, audit firms are 
most likely willing to make more concessions considering the fee, when it comes to large, 
multinational companies. According to Ettredge et al. (2014, 249), especially during the great 
recession (2007-2009), companies were giving price pressure for auditors when they were expecting 
auditors to share the economic pain by agreeing to fee reductions. When audit firms don’t want to 
lose their client to another BIG4 auditor for example, and when the revenue is high, the audit fee is 
still high in absolute value, even though its relative share from the revenue would slightly lower. That 
is why auditors may be more flexible with bigger firms in terms of audit fees. With smaller firms the 
situation is usually the opposite. The audit fee is relatively high when compared to revenue because 
the revenue level is so low. Even though the relative share of audit fee is high, the fee in absolute 
value may be quite low. Sometimes even too low when compared to needed workload. 
  
Another reason is that in auditing, it can be relatively less expensive to conduct an audit when the 
firm is bigger, because certain assurance assignment must be done whether the firm is big or not. The 
CPA Journal (2016) for instance underlines, that auditors must perform all procedures required by 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) whether or not the procedures are useful under the 
circumstances. The SEC, the PCAOB, ERISA, and the Yellow Book add additional steps, but nothing 
eliminates any. This means that the effort auditors input before, during and after the audit, may not 
be that much higher with companies that have large turnover. Moreover, the planning of audit, 
gathering the data, calculating the materiality levels, selecting the sample and testing this sample must 
be done despite the size of the company. When for example the sample is selected and tested, the 
increased effort and required time is most likely less than the increase in revenue when comparing 
bigger and smaller clients. For that reason, audit firms do not have to ask 5 or 6 percent audit fee in 
relation to client’s revenue, when the revenue may be 400 billion for example. With smaller firms, 5-
6 percent share might be necessary to perform the audit adequately.  
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In fact, I suggest that the effort does not increase at all after a certain point, because of the economy 
of scale. Let’s take the auditing for accounts receivables for instance. It doesn’t differ that much how 
accounts receivables are audited whether the firm is big or small, when auditors applicate audit 
procedures to less than 100 per cent of the items within a population. The biggest difference is only 
in sample size, when the sample to be tested is naturally in relation to sampling population’s book 
value. With large firms with large revenue, there is more comprehensive sample to be tested, which 
may require more auditors to perform this testing, or more time from one auditor. However, with 
smaller firms this also requires at least one auditor. Especially when the book value of accounts 
receivables is high, the needed effort (i.e. sample size) does not increase with the same scale as 
turnover, when compared to smaller clients. (See e.g. Eilifsen et.al. 2014, 260, 312). When adding 
here the role of internal control, small companies usually don’t have enough resources do organize 
their internal controls that well that bigger firms do, so it requires more effort from auditor to audit 
these controls, or in some cases, evaluate the consequences because of the lack of these controls.  
 
In addition to expected higher relative share of audit fees, there’s also an assumption that smaller 
firms have faced relatively more increase in those fees. For example, costs emerging from compliance 
regarding SOX and all other GAAP standards are naturally higher for smaller companies. This 
assumption is supported by Iliev (2010), whose study concentrated in small public companies. 
According to him, there were significant SOX-specific costs for small firms, and that audit fees 
increased among small companies by 98% in year 2004. (Iliev 2010, 1166). Moreover, financial crises 
occurring during 21st century would have most likely more impact on smaller organizations, when 
they don’t have that vast asset base and buffer against changes in economic environment. Based on 
this reasoning, it is expected with Hypothesis 2, that the ratio of audit fees to sales is bigger for smaller 
firms, and that the ratio has also increased over time relatively more for smaller firms. The second 
and the last hypothesis is then divided into two following elements: 
 
H2a: The ratio of audit fees to sales is higher for smaller firms. 
H2b: The ratio of audit fees to sales have increased over time  
relatively more for smaller firms. 
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5. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
This section will introduce the data used in this research as well as the methodology practiced in 
empirical tests. The data and sampling section includes sources, characteristics and sampling of the 
data, while the methodology section presents the models to be tested, and methods used in this testing. 
In the following chapter, empirical tests and actual results are reviewed.  
 
5.1 Data and sampling 
 
The data used in this research is obtained from Audit Analytics database, which provides detailed 
research on over 150,000 active audits and more than 10,000 accounting firms.3 The used dataset 
contains all fee data disclosed by SEC registrants in electronic filings since January 1, 2000. Thus, 
the dataset covers years 2000-2017, 2017 being last complete fiscal year. The data includes 
companies in various countries, sizes and industries, and it was exported from Audit Analyt ic s’ 
database directly to software called SAS (Statistical Analysis System). All the modifications of data 
and empirical tests are implemented with SAS, which enables advanced analytics, multivar ia te 
analyses, data management, and predictive analytics.4 With SAS, different kind of codes create a 
procedure, which then performs analysis and reports on datasets to produce statistics, analyses, and 
graphics. In this research, I’m using SAS instead of Excel because SAS can process large amount of 
data quickly, and different types of time series and regression analyses are easier to execute. Also, 
data adjustments with excel would much more likely create errors than with SAS. However, SAS 
does not offer high-quality graphs or diagrams, and for that reason all graphics and tables are made 
with Microsoft software such as Excel and Word. The program version used in the study is SAS 9.4. 
 
After the data was exported to SAS, certain modifications were made. For example, variables BIG4, 
AF2SALES, NAF2SALES and TF2SALES were created, when these were not available directly from 
Audit Analytics. After these additions, the data was adjusted in order to create the final sample, where 
all missing values and outliers would be deleted. The initial sample included 216,709 firm-year 
observations. When variable including audit fees (AF) is used in several models, it was important that 
                                                 
3 https://www.auditanalytics.com  
4 https://support.sas.com/en/support-home.html  
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these observations were complete. Therefore, all audit fees that equaled zero or were blank were 
deleted first. Secondly, all foreign or firms registered in Canada were removed, when the study 
focuses on U.S. based firms. After this, all observations that had variable TF2SALES over twenty 
percent, were deleted. In this situation, the total fees, e.g. audit fees and tax fees, are over 20% of 
company’s sales, and it indicates that the firm is most likely in financial distress or the observation is 
an outlier. For that reason, these observations were removed from the sample. Lastly, all revenue 
values that were less than 100,000 ($) were deleted.  By this, all outlier observations or observations 
that are probable to be distorted, are omitted. For example, many firms had revenue value of one (1) 
dollar, which is highly unlikely and probably caused by system errors. After these deductions, the 
final sample included 123,880 firm-year observations (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Sample selection criteria 
Audit Analytics database Firm-year observations 
  
Initial firm-year observations 216,709 
  
Less: 
Audit fees not available 
Foreign companies 
Companies that are registered in Canada 
Total fees/Revenue >20% 
Revenue <100,000$ 
 
 
-1,392 
-17,790 
-8,916 
-3,155 
-61,576 
 
Final Sample 123,880 
 
The final sample of 123,880 firm-year observations will be first analyzed as a one group so that 
overall picture can be formed. However, after this the data is further distributed to deciles by 
company’s revenue and fiscal year. This enables more comprehensive analysis, when differences 
between smaller and larger firms can be seen more clearly. Also, this way the final results should be 
more comparable to J.R. Francis’ study, where the data was also analyzed first in one group, and then 
by deciles. The distribution to deciles is also done by SAS. As a result, ten roughly same size units 
are formed (Appendix A). The small variation in unit sizes comes from distribution, where the data 
is divided into deciles within every fiscal year, not the whole data set by once. This way we can get 
deciles that have same amount of observation from each year in relation to the final sample. If the 
distribution would have been done by dividing the whole sample in ten groups, there would be 
relatively less observations from the earlier years than later ones. For example, year 2000 had only 
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3,969 observations while year 2017 had 5,473 observations (See Appendix B). Now, when the 
separation to deciles is done inside every fiscal year, there is no uneven distribution between different 
years within deciles. 
 
 
5.2 Methodology 
 
The methodology employed in this study is quantitative analysis, using time series and regression 
analyses, and further, studying the development of different variables over time. Empirical tests start 
by observing the whole data set as a one, single sample. Firstly, time series analysis for audit fees is 
formed. This is conducted by using mean (average) values of audit fees in relation to firms’ sales over 
18-year period. Time series analyses are presented with general graphs for creating an overview of 
audit fees’ development in the 21st century. After time series analyses, regression analyses between 
relative audit fees and different fiscal years are run for examining the variables’ behavior over time.  
Results regarding complete sample are presented in section 6.2. After these comes the time series 
analysis and regression analysis for deciles. Deciles’ regressions are done by using cross-sectional 
regressions, where different coefficients are examined within every decile. With deciles, mult ip le 
regression model is also used for achieving more accurate results regarding different sized firms’ 
development over time. These results are presented in section 6.3. Lastly, a sensitivity analysis is 
formed for ensuring the robustness of the results. These are presented in section 6.4 in the end of 
Chapter 6. 
 
5.1.1 Model development 
 
What comes to methodology of regression analyses, the main objective of this study is to examine 
how audit fee rates in relation to company’s revenue have changed over time. This means that there’s 
only one dependent variable – time (trend). For that reason, I will use mainly the simple regression 
model instead of multiple regression model, when in simple regression model, there is only one 
dependent variable, and one independent variable. Therefore, the simple regression model is perfectly 
adequate for the main purpose of this study. The dependent variable can also be named as explained 
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variable or “y”, and the independent variable as explanatory variable or “x” (see e.g. Wooldridge, 
2012). The basic form for simple regression model is then following:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢 
 
where:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡   is the dependent variable for observation i on time t 
𝛽0  is the intercept 
𝛽1  is the slope parameter 
𝑥𝑖𝑡   is the independent variable for observation i on time t 
𝑢    is the error term  
 
 
Thus, in simple regression model the main focus is to study the relationship between two variables 
while all other relevant factors are held fixed. This is usually considered as a weakening factor, when 
it is extremely difficult to create ceteris paribus conclusions about how x affects y (see e.g. 
Wooldridge, 2012). In addition to this, naturally there’s usually more than one explanatory variable 
that explains the y. However, as said, when studying the relation of audit fees and revenue over time, 
the simple regression model is suitable for this purpose because we are only interested in dependent 
variable’s coefficient, and how it acts during the given time. In the first model, the objective is to 
study what is the average (mean) proportion of audit fees from company’s sales, and how this variable 
develops during the examination period. Variable TREND is formed for describing the change over 
time, and it is an ordinal time variable where year 2000 gets value of 0 and 2017 gets value of 17. 
The first model covers all observations without any distributions to deciles. The first model is then 
following: 
 
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢  (1) 
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where 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) indicates the average share of audit fees to sales for all companies, and the 
variable 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000  is the ordinal time variable, where FY indicates fiscal year (N=18). The 
coefficient 𝛼1 is the parameter estimate (regression coefficient) that we are interested in. The 
coefficient is slope for TREND-variable in this linear regression model, and it tells directly how much 
the relation between audit fees and sales increases or decreases when one year is added. If the 
coefficient is positive, it means that the higher the fiscal year, the higher also the fee, that is, audit 
fees have increased during investigation period. In the rest of the model, 𝛼0 is the intercept of the 
model and u indicates all other relevant information in this association. Model (1) will be conducted 
first to the whole dataset without any scaling, and it should test Hypotheses H0 and H1. After this, 
same regression will be driven for every decile. Model (2) indicates deciles’ simple regression model 
when considering average (mean) values of AF2SALES. It’s very similar to model (1), now there’s 
only variable D indicating different deciles (D=1-10). Model (2) is following: 
 
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
)𝐷 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝐷𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢                       (2) 
 
where 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
)𝐷   indicates the average of audit fees’ share of revenue for decile D. The slope 
𝛽𝐷   is the regression coefficient of decile D for variable TREND. Hence, 𝛽1 is the regression 
coefficient for Decile 1 etc. Rest of the model is same as above. This model will be driven in SAS 
resulting 180 different regression in total, when there are eighteen fiscal years under examination 
(N=18), and ever decile has its own coefficient β (N=10). Model (2) is for testing hypothesis H2a. 
Unlike models above, the third and final model is based on multiple regression instead of simple 
regression. This is for achieving better results considering Hypothesis H2b. For studying have smaller 
companies’ relative audit fees increased more over time when compared to bigger firms, variable 
TREND*DECILE is added besides variables TREND and DECILE. This variable takes into account 
over time -concept simultaneously with decile factor. If variables are only evaluated separately, it 
doesn’t tell whether trend variable for example is positive because of firm size, or because of other 
factors. It is expected that coefficient 𝑎3 for variable TREND*DECILE is negative, when bigger 
decile should mean relatively descending fees over time. Model (3) is following: 
 
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) = 𝑎0  +  𝑎1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷 +  𝑎2𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐿𝐸 +  𝑎3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐿𝐸 +  𝑢                      (3) 
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The model and its elements remain rather same than above, now there’s only two explanatory 
variables more, and each of these explanatory variables has its own regression coefficient a. 
Additionally, there are few other models used in sensitivity analysis, but they are all based on models 
introduced here, only the sample changes. For that reason, additional models are not presented here, 
and they are only reviewed along with sensitivity analysis.  
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6. EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, I will first introduce the descriptive statistics of the sample used in empirical tests. 
Then, time series analyses and regressions will be conducted for both datasets, first to the whole 
sample without any distributions, and then for different deciles. Results for complete sample are 
presented in section 6.2. and for deciles in section 6.3. After this, a sensitivity analysis is carried out 
for creating comparison and improving the credibility and quality of this study. This is covered in 
section 6.4. Final conclusions considering the results are disclosed in the next chapter.   
 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 2 below. As mentioned in previous chapter, 
variables AF2SALES, NAF2SALES and TF2SALES were created with data adjustments. In 
AF2SALES-variable, company’s audit fees are divided by sales. In NAF2SALE-variable non-audit 
fees are divided by sales and in TF2SALES total fees.  As we can see, the amount of observations for 
every variable is 123,880 firm-year observations, which matches the size of final sample (Table 1). 
This means that after data adjustments, all data is useable and have zero blank values. In addition, 
outlier observations were removed for reducing variation in the sample, as well as improving the 
usefulness of results. These are visible in the minimum and maximum values of Revenue and 
TF2SALES. It is also visible from the table, that Audit fees and Non-audit fees create Total fees values 
when summed up together. In fact, audit fees include only the bare audit fee for annual audit service, 
while non-audit fees contain all the other payments identified as fees. Non-audit fees include e.g. tax 
fees and SIC fees, but also audit related fees, unlike the variable name suggests. The last variable in 
descriptive statistics is BIG4 which is a dummy variable based on auditor key -variable, where it gets 
value 1 if the auditor key is 1-4 (BIG4), and value 0, if it’s not. From the table we can see that 66.3 
percent of all auditors in the data belong to BIG4. The percentage is surprisingly low, especially when 
the data includes only listed companies, and those usually tend to use auditors from BIG4 as explained 
previously. Yet, this implies that the data is diverse, and that comparison between these two groups, 
BIG4 and non-BIG4, can be prepared. This is done in sensitivity analysis. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for variables used in this study. 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
Revenue 123,880 1,939,493,066 10,466,398,978 100,000 125,472,500 485,873,000,000 
Audit Fees 123,880 1,231,224 3,600,030 0,370 312,912 203,375,000 
Non-Audit Fees 123,880 431,660 2,093,672 0.000 48,800 131,000,000 
Total Fees 123,880 1,662,884 5,086,603 0,375 422,000 203,375,000 
Audit fees/Sales 123,880 0.009 0.021 0.000 0.0024 0.199 
Non-audit fees/Sales 123,880 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.0004 0.157 
Total fees/Sales 123,880 0.011 0.024 0.000 0.0032 0.199 
BIG4 123,880 0.663 0.473 0.000 1.0000 1.000 
Descriptive statistics include variable name, number of observation (N), mean, standard deviation (std dev), minimum, median and 
maximum values of the sample. The number of firm-year observation is 123,880 after deleting following: (1) audit fees that are not 
available, (2) foreign companies, (3) companies that are registered in Canada, (4) companies that had total fees over 20% of revenue 
and (5) companies that had revenue under 100,000$. Variable Audit fees/Sales is audit fees divided by sales, later referred a s 
AF2SALES. Non-audit fees/Sales is non-audit fees divided by sales, later referred as NAF2SALES. Total fees/Sales is total fees 
divided by sales, later referred as TF2SALES. BIG4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor belongs to BIG4 and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Audit fee analysis by complete sample 
 
6.2.1 Time series analysis for complete sample 
 
When starting to examine audit fee levels and behavior during investigation period, a general time 
series analysis can be formed. In this analysis, the time series is drawn between fiscal year (x-axis), 
and audit fees divided by company’s sales (y-axis). Now, results are first introduced for complete 
sample and they cover whole 18-year period. In Table 3 below are presented mean values of 
AF2SALES by complete sample, in which time series graphic is based on. Mean of AF2SALES is 
the average value of division where that year’s audit fee is divided by company’s annual sales. The 
division is first calculated for every observation and the average is then computed for every fiscal 
year. Values are presented as percentages: 
 
  
 42 
Table 3. Yearly mean values of audit fees by complete sample. Percentage of sales.  
 
Year N Mean for AF2SALES (%) 
2000 3,969 0.487   
2001 6,161 0.483   
2002 8,201 0.659   
2003 8,934 0.802   
2004 9,003 0.916   
2005 8,944 0.959   
2006 8,374 0.909   
2007 7,394 0.938   
2008 7,410 0.950   
2009 6,895 0.971   
2010 6,557 1.014   
2011 6,202 1.000   
2012 5,931 0.977   
2013 5,927 1.020   
2014 5,951 1.046   
2015 6,416 1.010   
2016 6,138 0.991   
2017 5,473 0.910   
Total 123,880 0.891 
 
 
Figure 2 below is a line chart graphic of audit fees’ development based on values from Table 3. It is 
easy to see that the average rate of audit fee in relation to company’s sales has increased remarkably 
in the 21st century. In the beginning of examination period audit fee rate was quite low, when on 
average around 0.5 percent of firms’ revenue was spent on audit fees. However, after first two years, 
the increase in audit fees has been radical, and when coming to year 2005, the AF2SALES was as 
much as 0.96 percent. The growth from year 2000 to year 2005 was 0.47 percentage points, which is 
almost 97 percent. Audit fee in relation to revenue had therefore almost doubled in few years. 
Nevertheless, the actual peak for audit fee rate was not until year 2014, when on average audit fees 
were 1.05 percent of companies’ revenue. This proportion is rather large, especially when considering 
how much it would eventually be from company’s result. Also, this rate reflects only the average 
values where smaller and larger firms compensate those peaks. Maximum and minimum values of 
AF2SALES should therefore be even more distinct, when viewing different deciles separately. This 
will be however considered more closely in following chapter. 
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Figure 2. Audit fees’ development in relation to sales during 2000-2017 (%). 
 
 
There’re actually two clear reasons why the increase starting from year 2001 forward is so massive. 
First one is the accounting scandals happening 2002 that included Enron, AA, WorldCom and Tyco 
International. Naturally, scandals like these had effects on accounting and auditing societies around 
the world and increased market’s uncertainty. Especially when AA withdrew from the market, the 
increase in demand among auditees explains the sudden growth in some extent, but the increase seems 
still rather steep, especially when taking into account that there was plenty of other auditors in the 
market besides the remaining BIG4. Also, clients of former AA may have wanted to select auditor 
outside the BIG4 due decreased confidence. In the data, BIG4 covered 66.3 percent of auditors (See 
Table 2), which means that over a third of auditors were outside of BIG4. In addition to this, AA’s 
bankruptcy should have result price competition at some level, when every operator on the market 
tries to engage some of the AA’s clients. This should have decreased the audit fees, not increase them. 
This was also suggested by Asthana et al., but on the contrary, they also found that BIG4 auditors 
asked premium prices from former AA clients. (Asthana et al. 2009). This should thus increase the 
initial fee level as well.  
 
After Enron and other similar scandals, companies were most likely doubting the audit quality and 
were less willing to pay more for auditing, but still audit fees almost doubled. The second reason to 
explain observed growth is SOX, which was mainly due of those scandals. SOX’s main objective 
was to increase the credibility of financial statements, and the act created lot of additiona l 
requirements, especially for financial statement providers, but also for auditors. This would naturally 
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be visible in the amount of fees. However, it should be noticed that the ratio between audit fees and 
sales does not tell, if the increase in audit fees is actually coming from increase in prices, or from the 
increase in required auditing work – or from both of them. Thus, mean values cannot directly explain 
whether the increase in audit fees is coming from increase in prices because audit firms wanted to 
raise fees, or is it coming from added requirements and audit work. For auditors, the regulators’ 
concern of audit quality increased their workload by the most. But was the audit quality improved 
after SOX came into force? According to The Financial Executives International’s (FEI) study, SOX 
had improved investor confidence in financial reporting, which after all, was the primary objective 
of the legislation. (FEI, 2007). Chambers and Payne (2011), also found that audit quality improved 
post-SOX especially among BIG4 auditors, as introduced in Chapter 3. These results then suggest 
that at least part of the increase starting from year 2001 may be due of improved audit quality, when 
better audit quality requires more effort from the auditor, and it is also a reason for asking higher 
price. Therefore, improved audit quality would increase the fee level. 
 
So, after Enron scandal fees started to increase, and they didn’t turn down until the year 2006. From 
year 2006 onwards, there has been slight, steady growth in audit fees until year 2010, when fees 
started to decline again. Between years 2006-2010, fees improved by 11.6 percent, which may be 
consequence from financial crisis which began 2007. The crisis was most likely predictable already 
in year 2006, especially among auditors who followed financial markets closely. The US housing 
bubble also broke in year 2006, and auditors may have been preparing to the uncertain future by 
raising audit fees (See e.g. Acharya et al 2009, 89). This development is somewhat surprising, when 
according to Ettredge et al. (2014), organizations were giving pressure on audit firms to reduce audit 
fees due the great recession. It was acknowledged in the study that this kind of fee pressure existed 
during great recession, and it concerned regulators in terms of audit quality: “The Recession imposed 
significant financial pressure on many companies. Regulators expressed concerns that audit fee 
pressure from clients might have had negative effects on audit quality during the Recession.” 
(Ettredge et al. 2014, 249.) However, it was argued in the same study that the main pressure came 
from clients that were in financial distress or had other accounting issues and was thus more likely to 
have accounting misstatements. This may explain why the fee pressure is not showing in Figure 2 
that well, because companies that were deeply in financial distress were omitted from the data. When 
fees seemed to increase, it was natural cause when economic situation was globally unstable and 
difficult, and the amount of financially distressed companies may have increased. However, it is also 
interesting that after year 2010 fees seem to decrease, when the expectation would be the opposite 
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due the Dodd-Frank act. This may indicate that Dodd-Frank didn’t had impact on audit fees because 
the regulation considered mainly client side, including banks and mortgage lenders. This should 
complicate clients’ situation, but not auditors’ in that scale, that it would be visible in audit fees as 
well. On the contrary, SOX had direct influence on auditors along with auditees, and therefore fees 
reacted more on SOX.  
 
Overall, mean values have saw back and forth quite much, and starting from year 2014, fees begun 
to reduce over again. In fact, after year 2014 the decline has been quite deep, which may indicate that 
client companies started to think that fees have gone up too high, and that they are not willing to pay 
demanded prices anymore. On the other hand, the decline can also be result from learning curve, but 
this would of course require that majority of the engagements have been lasting after year 2002. 
Additionally, learning curve would be showing with SOX also, when firms would have had enough 
time to adjust for SOX requirements and other changes on their market, such as for change from BIG5 
to BIG4. Hence, auditors would have been able to cut back their expenses and improve efficiency, 
which would mean that audits would be possible to execute with less effort, but with adequate quality. 
This would be showing as decrease in audit fees. In general, results here are similar than in Francis 
(2004) study, when he got relative audit fee share to be only 0.1% from sales in the beginning of 
millennium. Also here the starting fee level was rather low, 0.5%. He also predicted that SOX should 
increase this ratio remarkably, which was also visible in the figure.  
 
When viewing time series for AF2SALES in general, fees have increased during last 18 years, but 
after different crises during 2002 and their repercussions, the growth has been quite moderate. The 
overall increase in mean values of AF2SALES has however been significant, when audit fees have 
grown from year 2000 to year 2017 by 86.81 percent. Yet, it is worth noticing for that inflation is a 
natural explanatory factor for a part, and when audit fee rates for years 2000 and 2001 are distinct ly 
low, it may distort these results, especially when there’s no data before year 2000. In addition, the 
fact that fees have increased mainly during years 2001-2005 implicate, that the fee increase is because 
of SOX, and furthermore, most likely because of improved audit quality. After the quality 
improvements and adoption of new regulation, the increase is not that visible, when there has been 
no pressure for audit firms to increase their fees. When in Chapter 3 a question was raised whether 
too much is invested in audits, results here suggest that this may not be the case. It seems that even 
though the increase was massive in the beginning of 21st century, it is mainly coming from audit 
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quality improvements. In addition, according to Francis (2004) between years 2002-2003 the audit 
failure rate was low, which also indicates good audit quality. Therefore, these results suggest that 
after year 2001 audit quality was at least partly improved. Afterwards fees have not increased 
relatively that much, and after year 2014 even declined. Next, the same trend is examined with 
regression models for creating more detailed results.   
 
6.2.2. Regression results for complete sample 
 
In Table 3 were presented the mean values of AF2SALES for years 2000-2017. These were derived 
from model (1), where the regression is formed between mean value of AF2SALES and trend-
variable. Regression results for Model (1) are presented in the Table 5 below. First in the table is the 
analysis of variance where the general results of how the model works are presented. Below that are 
the actual regression results. It can be seen that the model has used all 18 observations availab le 
(Table 3), and that the F-value is relatively high. Also, p-value of F is less than 0.05, which means 
that results can be considered as statistically significant. The p-value indicates the probability that the 
same result will occur by chance. The lower the p-value, the better the result because this means that 
results are not created randomly. R-square and Adjusted R-square (R2) support this presumption, 
when the R2 for instance is 0.549. This means that model can explain approximately 55% of the 
regression for mean values. This can be interpreted as good result, when the model can explain over 
half of the results. Furthermore, when recalling the Hypothesis 1, it would require low F-values, low 
R-square and Adjusted R-square values, and high p-value for the hypothesis not to be true. As we can 
see from the results, they are just the opposite. The model works fine and there is clear association 
between audit fees and sales over time. Therefore, the first hypothesis seems to be true. 
 
Table 4. Regression results for mean values of AF2SALES. Complete sample.  
Model: 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢 (1) 
  Parameter estimate T-value Pr > |t| 
Number of observations used 18    
Model’s F-value 21.67    
R-Square 0.575    
Adjusted R-Square (R2) 0.549    
Intercept  0.0066 11.51 <.0001 
Trend  0.0002 4.66 0.0003 
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When considering actual regression results, we will study closer models’ parameter estimates. These 
estimates are formed for intercept and for trend-variable, which is a variable for yearly change, that 
is, the coefficient 𝑎1 in model (1). From the results we can see that the intercept is 0.0066, that is, 
average relation between audit fees and company’s sales is around 0.7 percent over investigat ion 
period. That percentage of companies’ revenue is then going for audit fees. Furthermore, when 
considering the parameter estimate for mean’s trend-variable, the estimate is positive with value of 
0.0002. This indicates that the share from audit fees/sales is increasing by 0.02 percentage point in 
every year. In ten years, the growth would be 0.2 percentage points, and when this is converted to 
actual percentage, we get that the increase in ten years is over 37 percent.5 When we add eight more 
years to the calculation made above, we get that the average growth during the whole 18-year 
examination period would be over 67 percent. That can be considered as a massive increase. We can 
also see that standard error values are rather low, and conversely, T-values quite high, especially with 
intercept. This indicates that the size of variation is moderate, and that the regression coeffic ient 
(parameter estimate) is statistically distinct from zero. However, the greater the T-value the better, so 
T-value with trend-estimate could be even higher in optimal situation. Still, p-value with both factors 
is below 0.05, which is considered as a limit for statistical significance. Therefore, all results are 
statistically significant and suitable for generalization. When parameter estimate for trend-variab le 
indicates that the rise in audit fees in ten years would be over a third, and results are statistica lly 
significant, prove these results together with time series analysis that the Hypothesis 1 is true. The 
relative share of audit fees increased during 2000-2017. Next, same analyses as above are formed for 
different deciles. 
 
 
6.3 Audit fee analysis by deciles 
 
 
As said, the general assumption of audit fees’ development is that fees have risen during the last two 
decades. It was also clearly visible in analysis made above regarding complete sample. In Chapter 4 
it was also suggested with hypothesis development, that smaller firms pay relatively more audit fees, 
and that their fees have also increased more when compared to bigger firms. For investigating this 
                                                 
5 10-year aspect = (((intercept + parameter estimate)/intercept) - 1)*100*10 
= (((0.00658-0.00024582)/0.00658) - 1)*100*10 = 37.36 % 
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progress more closely, audit fee analysis will be created for data that has been divided into deciles. 
As was with complete sample, first the time series analysis is formed and after that, regression 
analysis. 
 
6.3.1 Time series analysis for deciles 
 
In this section with deciles, the mean of variable AF2SALES is calculated for every fiscal year as 
was with complete sample, but now the same must be calculated to every decile as well. Table 4 
below is composed of mean values of AF2SALES for every decile: 
 
Table 5. Yearly mean values of audit fees divided by sales. Deciles 1-10 (%).  
Year D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
2000 2.865   0.693   0.414   0.294   0.213   0.147   0.104   0.069   0.050   0.028   
2001 2.804   0.684   0.414   0.301   0.214   0.150   0.110   0.074   0.051   0.028   
2002 3.912   0.922   0.536   0.395   0.269   0.209   0.141   0.093   0.073   0.040   
2003 4.725   1.207   0.639   0.444   0.342   0.242   0.174   0.119   0.086   0.048   
2004 4.821   1.458   0.791   0.554   0.478   0.374   0.276   0.203   0.128   0.082   
2005 5.064   1.510   0.826   0.574   0.497   0.399   0.294   0.211   0.142   0.079   
2006 4.815   1.354   0.823   0.559   0.499   0.359   0.285   0.195   0.131   0.074   
2007 5.053   1.543   0.742   0.566   0.454   0.387   0.267   0.181   0.121   0.072   
2008 5.382   1.477   0.729   0.525   0.430   0.353   0.248   0.176   0.115   0.066   
2009 5.342   1.544   0.860   0.563   0.442   0.352   0.243   0.178   0.122   0.068   
2010 5.745   1.715   0.829   0.566   0.413   0.318   0.226   0.164   0.110   0.063   
2011 5.826   1.638   0.783   0.561   0.391   0.302   0.196   0.146   0.105   0.058   
2012 5.523   1.684   0.815   0.552   0.411   0.280   0.201   0.144   0.107   0.058   
2013 5.634   1.887   0.890   0.569   0.422   0.285   0.210   0.151   0.098   0.059   
2014 5.789   1.932   0.889   0.592   0.443   0.286   0.211   0.160   0.102   0.058   
2015 5.349   1.852   0.903   0.624   0.439   0.342   0.242   0.168   0.121   0.067   
2016 5.256   1.779   0.910   0.603   0.432   0.317   0.266   0.161   0.121   0.067   
2017 5.025   1.553   0.785   0.506   0.406   0.293   0.218   0.144   0.108   0.063   
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Figure 3 shows mean_AF2SALES values tabled above for deciles 1-5. As we can see from the picture, 
the same trend that was visible in Figure 2, is also visible here, especially with Decile 1 which includes 
companies with the smallest turnover. In every line the influences of 2002’s incidents are visible, but 
with larger deciles they are harder to detect because of the smaller scale. Decile 3 has the closest 
values when compared to mean values in Figure 2, when the audit fee rate is starting approximate ly 
from 0.5% and stays just below 1%. However, the most important observation from Figure 3 is that 
the audit fee rate in relation to company’s turnover is remarkably higher with Decile 1 than with other 
deciles. Difference between the first and second decile is already massive, let alone when compared 
to deciles with bigger revenue. On average, the audit fee rate with Decile 1 is 3.5 percentage points 
higher than with Decile 2, and around three times the fee of Decile 3. In addition to this, in peak year 
2011, 5.8% of company’s revenue inside of Decile 1 was going for audit fees. When almost 6 percent 
of firm’s revenue is going for fees that don’t have any expectations of income formation back to the 
firm, it is alarming. Audit fee is a sunk cost, and it doesn’t create future income same way as 
investments for example do.  
 
Figure 3a. Audit fees’ development in relation to sales during 2000-2017. Deciles 1-5. 
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economy of scale. Also, firms that have small amount of sales doesn’t directly mean that the firm 
itself is small, when sales can be only temporarily low. Therefore, Decile 1 may include firms that 
have financial and other problems with their business, and sales are low because of that. Hence, fees 
may seem to be high because Decile 1 includes most of the companies with financial problems. It 
should also be noted that observations with low sales level obviously heightens the relative audit fee 
rate for Decile 1. Some companies had revenue such as 100,000$, which would result six percent 
audit fee rate if the fee is around $6,000. This may not be unreasonable, especially if the firm has 
complicated business environment, it is in financial distress, or if the business is quite vast, but the 
revenue is only temporarily low. Still, when the level of Decile 1’s audit fee is that much higher than 
the next smallest decile’s, it raises concerns of remaining outliers in the data. For ruling possible 
distortion out, additional tests were conducted where revenue was adjusted to $500,000 at minimum 
instead of $100,000. This should remove observations where sales are that low, that it distorts the 
audit fee rate. This however didn’t have noticeable impact, and results with modified sample gave 
same overall result.  
 
Even though audit creates creditability that income statement and balance sheet give the true and fair 
view of company’s financial position, yet six percent from company’s revenue is unreasonably high, 
especially when we are considering firms with low revenue level. When the audit fee would be 
compared to firm’s profit or net income, it could possibly to reach that level, where companies would 
turn from unprofitable to profitable if audit fees would be removed. There were actually 9,596 
companies (7.7% from initial sample) that weren’t represented through the whole examination period, 
that is, they have either shut down their business, went bankrupt or unlisted themselves from stock 
exchange (go dark or go private) before year 2017. Majority of these companies have unlis ted 
themselves probably because of other reasons than financial distress, but the average AF2SALES 
percentage for these companies was around 1.8%, which is rather high. However, there was some 
variation in this sample, and for that reason, 25 percent of companies from this separate sample that 
had highest AF2SALES values, were selected for closer review. These should be the best 
representative for companies that may had been in financial distress or had high audit fee costs for 
some other reasons. Average audit fee ratio for those was 6.1%, which is around the same ratio that 
was with Decile 1 in figure above in peak year 2011. This supports the assumption that Decile 1 
includes firms with biggest financial problems. However, most likely that high audit fee ratio could 
speed up the financial distress and eventually lead the firm to bankruptcy, especially if the financ ia l 
situation was already difficult even without high audit fees. Also, it should be remembered that firms 
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with TF2SALES higher than 20%, were omitted from the data, which means that so called ‘basket 
case’ companies shouldn’t exist.  
 
What is interesting to notice, is that with deciles from five to ten (Figure 3b), the highest point is 
actually around 2005, not in 2014 or 2011 that was with smaller deciles or with complete sample. In 
fact, after the year 2005, audit fees seem to decline. So, even companies with the biggest revenue 
couldn’t avoid the Enron, AA and SOX effects, but after that, changes have been only minor, and the 
fee ratio has declined during most of the examination period. Also, as expected, Decile 10, the one 
that has biggest turnover, has the smallest relative audit fee rate and it also faces less fluctuation in 
those fees. With this decile, audit fees represent only around 0.06 percent of company’s revenue after 
the peak year 2004. Decile 10 is also only decile that has stayed below 0.1% the whole period. This 
result is similar with J.R. Francs’ study: “- - for the largest decile audit fees average less than 1/100 
of one per cent of sales.” (Francis 2004, 349). When recalling that the maximum revenue value in the 
Table 2 was almost 486 billion dollars (Walmart Inc. 2017) and that in average the audit fee rate for 
year 2017 was 0.00063 for Decile 10, the actual audit fee would still be over 308 million. This actually 
seems to be too high, especially when it is assurance service in question. When checking the actual 
audit fee amount for Walmart for year 2017, it was $19,394,000. That is, over 19 million audit fee 
had audit fee rate only of 0.00004. When on average the audit fee rate is around 0.06% inside the 
Decile 10, with Walmart it is 15 times smaller (0.004%). This emphasize the difference between the 
smallest and biggest companies, when even inside the largest decile differences can be that large. 
 
Figure 3b. Audit fees’ development in relation to sales during 2000-2017. Deciles 6-10. 
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After all, the conclusion is that the bigger the revenue, the smaller the relative fee. It is clearly visib le 
in Figure 3a and 3b that deciles with smaller revenue scale tend to pay noticeably more audit fees. 
They also face more fluctuation in those fees. It was also observable in the graph that with deciles 1-
5, the trend was rather upward than downward, while with decile 6-10 it was the opposite, at least 
after year 2004. All deciles from five to forward have descending trend line when considering the 
time after Enron crisis. This observation is supported by audit Analytics’ study, where it was shown 
that: “Since 2004, accelerated filers (i.e. large companies) have experienced a downward trend in 
audit fees despite the fact that the percentage of companies that were required to adhere to SOX 404 
increased during the same time period.” (Audit Analytics 2014, 4). In addition, when addressing the 
question of fairness of audit fee levels that smaller companies are facing, it should be remembered 
that the data is comprised of public companies. It means that there is no private entrepreneurs, bogus 
firms or firms that have ended the business but that still formally exist. Thus, these firms were quite 
large to beginning with even though the minimum revenue value was 100,000 dollars. So only few 
observations had truly small turnover. Therefore, these results are rather alarming when even with 
this scale the differences are that massive, not to mention what it would be between all firms despite 
their sales or if they are publicly traded or not. For achieving additional evidence of this development, 
regression analysis for deciles is formed next. 
 
6.3.2. Regression results for deciles  
 
In Table 4 were presented mean values of audit fees for years 2000-2017 by different deciles. These 
were derived from model (2), where the regression is formed between mean value of AF2SALES and 
decile in addition to trend variable. After determining deciles (Appendix A) and mean values (Table 
4), we can draw regression between these and the examination period. Table 6 below is showing the 
regression results from model (2): 
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Now every decile (N=10) has 18 observations, totaling 180 regression results. Thus, every decile 
includes compilation of all fiscal year values, and the regression model was able to create association 
for every fiscal year under examination period. However, from F-values we can see that this 
association is declining when moving to deciles with bigger revenue value. The F-value is high with 
Deciles 1-4, when e.g. Decile 2 has F-value of 43.77, but after that values decrease. Moreover, when 
viewing p-values of those values, we can interpret that only with Deciles 1-5 the F-value is 
statistically significant, that is, p-value is below 0.05. R-square and Adjusted R-square support this 
observation, when for Deciles 5-10 these explanatory levels are noticeably lower than with Deciles 
1-4. When comparing Deciles 2 and 8 for example, we can see that the model’s explanatory power 
for Decile 2 is over 71.5%, while with Decile 8 it is only 8.4%. These results indicate that association 
between audit fees and trend variable is lower from Decile 5 forward.  
 
When moving on to parameter estimates in which we are most interested in, we can see that results 
support conclusions made before. Based on time series analysis in previous section, we made an 
assumption that smaller deciles were paying relatively more when audit fees were compared to 
company’s revenue. Now we can see that intercept parameter estimate is 0.0375 for Decile 1, which 
basically means that on average, 3.75 percent of company’s revenue is going for audit fees. As was 
argued with time series analysis, this proportion is huge especially when we are talking about firms 
with low sales. Nevertheless, it was visible in the Figure 3 that decile one was remarkably above 
others. This is also visible here, when intercept values become more even from Decile 2 onwards. 
For example, Decile 3 has an intercept value of 0.0054, which means that averagely audit fees are 
only 0.54 percent of sales within this decile’s companies. Furthermore, it seemed that Decile 10 was 
paying clearly the least, and when intercept with Decile 10 is remarkably lower, averagely only 0.05% 
(0.0005) of companies’ revenue, it is in line with previous observation. Decile 1’s audit fee ratio is 
then over 78 times higher. All these results thus support observations from Figure 3. 
 
The second conclusion made earlier was that larger firms suffer relatively less increase in audit fees 
when moving forward in the 21st century. This development we can investigate more closely by 
comparing coefficient β for trend variable. We can see that values with Deciles 1 and 2 are 
considerably higher than with other deciles. Decile 1’s trend coefficient is 0.0013 and Decile 2’s 
0.0006. Even with these two deciles, the coefficient has almost halved, and the transition to other 
deciles is even more remarkable. When moving from smaller deciles to larger, the trend coeffic ient 
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moves steadily closer to zero, and t-values as well as p-values become worse. Deciles 6-10 are not 
statistically significant anymore what comes to trend coefficients. When looking again Decile 1, we 
see that audit fees increase in relation to revenue by 0.13 percentage points when one year is added. 
When adding the 10-year aspect that was already discussed in the previous section, we get that the 
increase in ten years would be over 33%. This is in line with previous results, where the increase in 
ten years was over a third even though it covered whole sample without any distributions. It is also 
directly visible in the table, that deciles 7-10 have so minor growth in their audit fees, that when 
coefficients are presented to four decimal places, the coefficient is zero. For example, coefficient for 
Decile 7 is 0.00004. So, on average, the audit fees grow by 0.004 percentage points when one year is 
added. 
 
When comparing these results to Francis’ study, we notice that in his research, the data consisted of 
5,500 large, U.S. based companies. That is remarkably lower sample, when in fact that is only around 
half of the sample that we have within every decile. However, it was interesting to notice that Francis 
got aggregate audit fees for those 5,500 companies to be around $3.4 billion, which meant that audit 
fees represented averagely only 0.04% of sales. (Francis 2004, 349). This is quite close to Decile 10’s 
intercept value, which is 0.05% of sales. When the data included only 5,500 large companies versus 
our 123,880, those companies most likely would be located in Decile 10, when it consisted of 12,382 
firms. Although these results are in line with conclusions made earlier and give us a view of audit 
fees’ development, it should be noted that the results for deciles 6-10 are not statistically significant 
when considering coefficient β. The p-value is above of 0.05 and the T-value is low. The intercepts 
however are statistically significant for every decile and those also have good T-values. Even though 
standard error values are low with every decile, the p-value indicates that the association between 
audit fees and different fiscal year is difficult to detect. It was visible in the previous section, that 
deciles 6-10 had extremely low values and they remained rather same after year 2004. Also, it was 
previously noted that even inside the deciles there may be large differences and variation.  
 
For achieving more accurate evidence considering Hypothesis 2a and 2b, additional regression model 
is conducted. Table 6 gave an assumption that smaller deciles pay relatively more audit fees (higher 
intercept value), and that also the increase is faster for them (higher regression coefficient). To 
examine this even more closely, a multiple regression where variables DECILE, TREND and 
combination of these two are the explanatory variables. Multiple regression model used is model 
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number (3), which was introduced in previous chapter. Table 7 below summarize the results of this 
regression. 
 
Table 7. Regression results for mean values of AF2SALES. Deciles 1-10. Multiple regression. 
Model: 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) = 𝑎0  +  𝑎1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷 +  𝑎2𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐿𝐸 +  𝑎3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐿𝐸 +  𝑢                  (3) 
 
Variable Parameter estimate Standard Error T-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.0194 0.000187 103.56 <.0001 
Trend 0.0007 0.000020 33.10 <.0001 
Decile -0.0027 0.000035 -77.76 <.0001 
Trend*Decile -0.0001 0.000004 -25.54 <.0001 
 
From results tabled above, we get supportive evidence of those two hypotheses to be true. Parameter 
estimate for variable TREND indicates, that general trend in audit fees is slightly increasing with 
value of 0.0007. This supports our previous conclusions. The second parameter estimate for variable 
DECILE is negative with value of -0.0027. It indicates that when decile grows, audit fee lowers. This 
is also in line with previous results ja support assumption of Hypothesis 2a. Both of the results are 
also statistically significant. The third variable where these two variables are combined, describes the 
deciles’ size impact over time best. Now the parameter estimate is negative, with value of -0.0001. 
This means that the bigger the decile the lower the fee when one year is added, that is, no increase 
over time for bigger firms. It supports the assumption of Hypothesis 2b. It has high T-value and low 
p-value, which indicate that the result is statistically significant. Based on these results, as well as on 
time-series analysis and other regression results considering model (2), we can draw a solid 
conclusion that Hypotheses 2a and 2b are true. That is, firms with lower revenue are paying relative ly 
more of audit fees than companies with bigger revenue do, and the ratio of audit fees to sales have 
increased over time relatively more for smaller companies.  
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6.4. Sensitivity analyses 
 
Now, after main results are presented and discussed, a sensitivity analysis can be formed. The purpose 
of these tests is to analyze, whether the observed phenomena truly exists, or is it only visible with 
limited data and other restrictions. In optimal situation, these tests will give additional information 
about audit fees’ development and behavior under examination period, and support previous results 
and conclusions at the same time. Additionally, we can hopefully rule out the possibility for distorted 
results. To get supportive evidence, the first sensitivity analysis is time series analysis for quintiles, 
which means that the data is divided into five equal size groups instead of ten that was done with 
deciles. After this, time series as well as regression analysis for median values of audit fees are 
formed. Besides these, analyses are also made for total fees as was done for audit fees. That is, both 
time series analysis and regression analysis are conducted for total fees also. This enables us to 
consider if the same behavior and trends are also visible with total fees, and we can also draw some 
conclusions of non-audit fees, when these are included in total fees, but not in audit fees. In addition 
to these, there’s also comparison between BIG4 auditors and non-BIG4 auditors in order to detect 
whether pricing differs between these two groups and if so called BIG4 premium exists. Lastly, it is 
examined whether same trends in audit fees are visible in Canada and in other foreign countries that 
they are in US. 
 
6.4.1. Quintiles  
 
When forming sensitivity analysis for quintiles, it should even the differences between the smalles t 
and largest groups, and therefore results may become more comparable. In Figure 4 is presented the 
audit fee ratio over time for different quintiles. The time series is based on mean values of audit fees. 
The distribution to quintiles and mean values of variable AF2SALES for this sample are presented in 
appendixes C and D, which can be found at the end of this study. It is clearly visible in the picture, 
that also with quintiles, the group with the smallest revenue scale is paying relatively more. Now the 
ratio for Quintile 1 doesn’t naturally reach to almost six percent that was with Decile 1, but it is still 
considerably higher when compared to Quintiles 2-5. While the difference between Deciles 1 and 2 
was around 3.5 percentage points, now with Quintiles 1-2 it is around 2.6 percentage points. The 
average ratio for Quintile 1’s audit fees is 3.2 percent. For a single fee, a three percent share from 
company’s revenue can be considered as substantial. Although, it should be noticed that the Quintile 
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1 includes Deciles 1 and 2 – the two deciles that had clearly the highest audit fee ratio. For that reason, 
the observation where Quintile 1 is noticeably higher than the others, was expected.  
 
Figure 4. Mean values of audit fees in relation to sales. Quintiles 1-5.  
 
 
Also, as earlier, the bigger the revenue goes the lower the audit fee ratio decreases. Quintiles 2-5 are 
all noticeably below one percent and seem to remain their level rather same during the whole 21 st 
century. As was with the whole sample and with different deciles, the events of year 2002 are visib le 
also here with every quintile. Nevertheless, the smallest quintile has faced a lot more intens ive 
increase in audit fees than the others. For examining Quintiles 2-5 more closely, the first quintile has 
been left out from next figure. Now we can see better, that even bigger quintiles have suffered fees’ 
increase after year 2002, but the increase is just in smaller scale. With Quintile 1 the increase from 
year 2001 to year 2005 was around 1.5 percentage points when with Quintile 2 it was around 0.35 
percentage points. With Quintile 5 the same number was around 0.07 percentage points. Interestingly, 
especially with Quintiles 3-5, fees seem to slowly decrease after year 2005. This was also observable 
with Deciles 5-10. Thus, these results give very similar outcome that was presented in sections 6.3.1 
and 6.3.2. Smallest group seems to pay relatively more audit fees and faces more increase in those as 
well. For larger firms, relative fees are at remarkably lower level and descending over time.  
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Figure 5. Mean values of audit fees in relation to sales. Quintiles 2-5. 
 
 
 
6.4.2. Median values  
 
Previously in this study audit fees have only been studied through mean (average) values. For 
achieving additional evidence, also median values are set under review. Figure 6 below represents 
median values of audit fees in trend line graph. Median values for audit fees are presented in Appendix 
E, and they are based on Model (1) but only with median values instead of mean values. Even though 
median values have remained at the same level almost through whole examination period, even there 
the increase due year 2002 crises are undoubtedly observable. In fact, with median values the increase 
between years 2000-2005 was even greater that was with mean values in Figure 2, when it rose to 
100.1 percent. With mean values the increase was 97 percent. This means that for median company, 
the audit fee actually doubled during those six years. Usually with median values the effects affecting 
from outside do not have same impact that is with average values, when median is just one observation 
in the middle of data. Yet, even with median values, the beginning of 2000’s was observable. 
However, what is more surprising is that median values are that much below average values. On 
average, median audit fee in relation to firm’s sales was 0.65 percentage points lower than with 
average company. Median company seems to pay significantly less audit fees than average companies 
do. Furthermore, they suffer less fluctuation, especially what comes for years after Enron and Arthur 
Andersen case. When reversing to Table 2, we can see that median company’s revenue is 
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$125,472,500. When on average the ratio between audit fees and revenue for median company is 
0.24% (cf. 0.89% with mean), it means that around 301,134 dollars are spent on audit fees. When the 
turnover is over 125 million, the rate seems reasonable after all.  
 
Figure 6. Audit fee development by median values of AF2SALES during 2000-2017 (%).  
 
 
When moving on to regression results, Table 8 presents the analysis of variance as well as parameter 
estimates for median values. When viewing analysis of variance, we see that all 18 observations are 
used, and that F-value is reasonable high. Additionally, standard error values are rather low, and 
conversely, T-values quite high, especially with intercept. P-value with both factors is below 0.05, so 
results are statistically significant. With parameter estimates, the intercept indicates that median 
company spends approximately 0.19 percent of its revenue for audit fees, and that the yearly increase 
is around 0.06 percentage points. Hence, the increase in ten years for median company would be over 
31 percent (cf. 37% for mean). These results indicate that median company not only pay less different 
kind of fees, but it also faces less increase in those fees, which was already suggested previous ly. 
After all, no matter if we are considering mean or median values, the rise in audit fees’ share of 
revenue in ten years would be over a third. Also, all results are in line with results considering mean 
values of complete sample, and there’s no incoherence between these two. 
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Table 8. Regression results for median of AF2SALES.  
Model: 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢 
 
AF2SALES 
(median) 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
T-value Pr > |t| 
Number of observations used 18     
Model’s F-value 13.29     
R-Square 0.4538     
Adjusted R-Square (R2) 0.4196     
Intercept  0.00188 0.000177 10.66 <.0001 
Trend  0.00006 0.000016 3.65 0.0022 
 
 
6.4.3. Total Fees 
 
For creating deeper analysis of audit fees behavior during the past 18 years, audit fees are next 
compared to total fees. Now, total fees include audit fees, but also audit related fees, non-audit fees 
as well as other fees such as tax fees. Audit fees then represent the pure fee for annual audit, but total 
fees include all possible fees that companies are facing. As was with audit fees, first the time series 
analysis is formed and after that the same two regressions that were driven for audit fees, are run for 
total fees (Models 1 and 2). Now also the median values are included. From Appendix F you can find 
mean and median values for variable TF2SALES (total fees divided by sales) for every fiscal year 
under examination period. The time series in Figure 7 is based on those values in Appendix F. As we 
can see from the picture, it is also almost identical with figures 2 and 7. Now the lines are naturally 
higher, when the absolute values are also higher than with bare audit fees. When comparing mean 
values of audit fees and total fees, we get that total fees are only around 0.2 percentage points higher 
than audit fees. Hence, audit fees alone covered around 80% of all fees. When other fees include i.a. 
audit related fees, benefit plan related fees, FISDI fees, tax related fees, compliance fees and other 
misc. fees, the proportion for these is surprisingly low. However, this development was clearly seen 
in Audit Analytics’ study as well, when they reported that after year 2002 when SOX was implied, 
audit fees went up, and non-audit fees down, and they also got audit fees representing around 80% of 
all companies’ fees post-SOX.   
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Figure 7. Total fees’ development in relation to sales during 2000-2017. Complete sample.  
 
 
When moving on to regression results of total fees, they are similar to audit fees, but certain 
differences can also be seen. For instance, regression results of median_TF2SALES are not 
statistically significant, when F-value is quite low, p-value is over 0.05 and the explanatory power is 
only 15.9 percent with R-square and only 10.65 percent with adjusted R-square (Table 9). When 
compared to mean values of TF2SALES, the F-value for example is much higher and statistica lly 
significant with p-value of 0.001. When the regression is formed between mean of TF2SALES and 
trend variable, the explanatory power is around 50 percent which is noticeably higher than with model 
where median values are the independent variable. The mean_TF2SALES can thus explain around 
50% of the regression, while median_TF2SALES reach only to 10 percent. When considering results 
of median_AF2SALES, it was able to explain considerably more the phenomena with adjusted R-
square value of 42%. However, median may not represent the whole sample that well, and mean 
results should be given more weight, especially now, when the results considering median values are 
that weak. Now the intercept parameter estimates are naturally higher than with audit fees, when the 
absolute amount of fees is also higher. On average, 0.9 percent of company’s revenue goes to different 
kind of fees, when the audit fees’ share of that was 0.7 percent. That is, around 20% is then coming 
from other fees than audit fees, which was already assigned previously. For median firm the intercept 
is 0.3%, which is interesting, because it is only about a third of average firm’s fees. Thus, it seems 
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that median firms are paying much less both audit fees and other fees. For both intercepts, mean and 
median, the p-value is less than 0.05 and the results are therefore statistically significant. T-values are 
also high for both of them, and on the contrary, standard error values are low. All these factors indicate 
that intercept values are significant and generalizable, and therefore reliable results. 
 
Table 9. Regression results for TF2SALES. Mean and median. 
Models: 
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(
𝑇𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢 
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(
𝑇𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢 
Analysis of variance  Mean_TF2SALES Median_TF2SALES 
Number of observations used 18 18 
Model’s F-value 16.78 
0.5119 
0.4813 
3.03 
R-Square 0.1590 
Adjusted R-Square (R2) 0.1065 
Parameter estimates  
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error T-value Pr > |t| 
Mean_TF2SALES 
Intercept   0.00927 0.00039 23.53 <.0001 
Trend  0.00015 0.00004 4.10 0.0008 
Median_TF2SALES 
Intercept   0.00300 0.00011 27.54 <.0001 
Trend  0.00002 0.00001 1.74 0.1011* 
Asterisk (*) indicates that the result is not statistically significant.  
 
When comparing parameter estimates for trend-variables, those are actually lower than with audit 
fees. Now the average increase for total fee mean is 0.015 percentage points by every year, when with 
audit fees it was almost 0.025 percentage points. Hence, audit fees increase faster than total fees, and  
the increase in total fees is actually increase in audit fees. This also indicates that non-audit fees have 
neither increased, when total fees are sum of audit fees and non-audit fees. This result may stem from 
SOX, when SOX placed several restrictions for audit firms offering non-audit services such as 
consultancy. Fees from these assignments would be located in non-audit fees as well as in total fees. 
When it was no longer possible for audit firms to offer these kinds of services, they would transfer 
the profit from decreased fees into audit fees. This was already suggested by audit Analyt ic s’ 
researchers in Chapter 4. This would be showing as an increase in audit fees, but not in total fees in 
the same scale when non-audit fees decrease. This assumption is in line with these results. There is 
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also difference between average and median companies, when the yearly increase for median firm is 
around 0.002 percentage points in total fees, versus average firm’s 0.015. When these are converted 
to percentages and added with 10-year examination period that was used with audit fees also, we get 
that the increase in ten years for mean_TF2SALES is 16.1, percent, but only 5.8 percent for 
median_TF2SALES. This supports the conclusion made earlier, that median companies not only pay 
less different kind of fees, but they also face less increase in those fees.   
 
When viewing T- and p-values, all other results can be interpreted as statistically significant except 
the trend parameter estimate for median_TF2SALES. For that reason, the calculated 5.8 percent 
increase over ten years may indicate of some differences between average and median companies, 
but the result is not statistically significant. P-value for mean_TF2SALES trend’s parameter estimate 
is 0.0008 which is less than 0.05, but higher than intercepts’ p-values. The T-value 4.10 is also quite 
weak, because the slope is only remotely rising but at the same time the standard error is rather high. 
Therefore, results regarding total fees were very similar with audit fees, but in general, audit fees’ 
results provided better predictability and were more often statistically significant.  To summarize, it 
was observable from the results that median company paid less both audit fees and total fees and was 
also facing less increase in those. It was also visible that audit fees in relation to firm’s revenue have 
increase remarkably more than total fees, when considering the whole dataset as a single sample. On 
average, audit fees have risen over 37% in 10 years, when with total fees the same percentage was 
only around 16%. From this it was also possible to draw conclusion that the increase in total fees was 
actually coming mostly from audit fees. Total fees or non-audit fees weren’t increased with same 
pace.  
 
6.4.4. BIG4-auditors 
 
When discussing audit fees and their appropriate level, it should be noted that majority of all possible 
audits are done by four different audit firms. When the amount of big, globally known audit firms is 
that small, it raises questions about ‘BIG4-premium’. This may emerge e.g. from appreciate of their 
experience and know-how, or their vast resources, but it can also come from lack of competition or 
lack of certain expertise that only BIG4 auditors can provide. When previously in the study it was 
shown that audit fees have increased during 2000-2017 and that the increase has been sometimes even 
rapid, it should be studied whether this increase comes from BIG4 auditor prices, or is the trend 
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considering all auditors in general. For doing this, ‘BIG4’ dummy-variable was formed (See 
Descriptive Statistics). It is also worth noticing for, that in order to examine audit fees from auditor 
perspective, other than bare audit fees should be brought up, when usually audit firms tend to provide 
audit related and non-audit related services besides traditional audit. For that reason, in this section 
also non-audit fees (NAF) are examined in addition to audit fees and total fees. The structure of this 
section is however same as before, first the time series analyses are formed, and then regression results 
are disclosed. In the end of this section, regression is run for Deciles 1 and 10 also, in order to examine 
whether BIG4-premium exists only for smaller firms, as suggested in Chapter 2.  
 
The time series analysis for BIG4 and non-BIG4 auditors is based on mean values of audit fees (AF), 
non-audit fees (NAF) and total fees (TF). All figures 8-10 are based on mean values which are found 
in Appendixes G and H. In Figure 8 below are bare audit fees for BIG4 and non-BIG4 auditors. As 
we can see from the picture, audit fees in relation to revenue have been higher for non-BIG4 auditors 
during the whole 21st century. That was expected, when BIG4 auditors usually have clients with 
bigger sales, which naturally lowers the relative share of audit fees. Non-BIG4 audit firms on the 
other hand have typically smaller clients, and they may also have more challenging clients, when they 
try to get clean audit report by selecting auditor outside the BIG4 group. This suggestion is supported 
by Beatty (1989, 707) for example: “Larger and less risky clients were audited by Big Eight firms. ” 
Also, it was shown previously that most visible changes considered the smallest auditees, so the 
higher level of non-BIG4 fees was expected. However, especially when taking into account that the 
data includes only public companies, the gap between these two groups is quite large. Additiona lly, 
firms that had total fees in relation revenue over 20 percent were removed, which means that the data 
shouldn’t include companies that are seriously financially distressed. Considering these factors, the 
fact that non-BIG4 audit firms’ fees are that much higher when compared to BIG4, is slightly 
surprising. After year 2003, the difference between these two groups has been around 1.1 percentage 
points. 
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Figure 8. Mean values of audit fees for BIG4 and non-BIG4 auditors.  
 
 
As was with previous analyses, also here the general trend where fees increased radically after year 
2002 is visible. However, it is only clearly observable with non-BIG4 firms. With BIG4, the increase 
from year 2001 to year 2003 was only 0.1 percentage points, when for non-BIG4 it was 1.0 percentage 
points. That is, audit fees increased ten times more with non-BIG4 auditors. This is interesting notice, 
when the bankrupt of Arthur Andersen and additional SOX requirements should increase the fee level 
noticeably for both auditor groups, not just for non-BIG4. Yet, the explanation for minor increase 
may come from competitive situation, if remaining BIG4 firms started to fight over AA’s clients, and 
tried to persuade clients with lower audit fee levels. Then the AA’s withdrawal wouldn’t decrease the 
competition but increase it. Another explanation is that applying all the SOX requirements insisted 
relatively more effort from non-BIG4 firms. BIG4 firms may have had their operations closer to SOX 
requirements before it came into effect, and therefore they were able to apply SOX without increasing 
their fee level remarkably. This is also supported by the fact that before SOX, the gap between BIG4 
and non-BIG4 was much smaller. When considering audit fees’ development in general by comparing 
Figure 2 and Figure 8, we can see that the behavior of mean values of AF in Figure 2 is almost 
identical with non-BIG4 auditors’ line. From that we can draw a conclusion that the increase in audit 
fees with complete sample was actually coming mostly from non-BIG4’s audit fees and that BIG4 
firms retained their audit fee level rather same during the whole examination period.  
 
As mentioned above, when comparing different auditor groups, the role of non-audit services may be 
essential, and especially here, when AF included only bare audit fee. For that reason, also non-audit 
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fees should be compared between these two groups. In Figure 9 there’s non-audit fees in relation to 
sales for years 2000-2017. Like above, also here the fee level for non-BIG4 firms is higher than with 
BIG4, but the difference between these two is much smaller. Now the non-audit fee rate is only 0.1 
percentage points higher on average. Additionally, the trend here is the opposite when compared to 
audit fees, when lines for both groups are descending, and in the beginning of examination period the 
fee level for BIG4 firms was higher than with non-BIG4 firms. Here what is surprising, is that non-
audit fees were descending with both groups way before SOX came into force and limited the 
providence of these services. With BIG4 firms, the decrease was actually deeper before year 2002, 
and it slowed down post-SOX, continuing downwards until year 2006. This is the opposite from 
expected. What is also worth noticing for, is that with BIG4 firms, averagely NAF is around 0.1%, 
when audit fees are around 0.5% from client’s revenue post-SOX. However, in year 2000 when SOX 
didn’t apply yet, audit fees and non-audit fees were almost at the same level, and non-audit fees were 
actually higher than pure audit fees. In year 2000, non-audit fees were 0.46% from revenue when 
audit fees were only 0.40%. This underlines the importance of non-audit services for BIG4 audit firms 
before SOX. With non-BIG4 firms, the decrease is not that radical, which suggests that maybe non-
BIG4 firms didn’t offer non-audit services that much at the first place.  
 
Figure 9. Mean values of non-audit fees for BIG4 and non-BIG4 auditors.  
 
 
When adding audit fees and non-audit fees together, we get total fees. In Figure 10 below is presented 
total fees in relation to sales by these two auditor groups. Now the picture is naturally a combination 
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of those two pictures above. The trend in total fees, especially with non-BIG4, is similar to audit fees’ 
trend, when changes in non-audit fees were much smaller. Figure 10 also supports previous 
conclusions, when fee levels are higher with non-BIG4 auditors and the increase in total fees is purely 
coming from audit fees’ increase. Furthermore, increase in audit fees is mainly coming from non-
BIG4 auditors’ fees. From total fees we can also see that the events of 2002 are clearly more visib le 
with non-BIG4 auditors, and that total fee level for BIG4 firms has remain rather stable throughout 
the whole 21st century. Audit fees had increased slightly, but at the same time non-audit fees 
decreased. For that reason, total fees have been around 0.6-0.7 percent the whole time for BIG4. 
These results are somewhat surprising, when there were suggestions of ‘BIG4-pemium’ and when 
the general belief is that BIG4 can price their fees higher because of their expertise and resources for 
instance. Yet, at least relative fees are higher with smaller auditors than with BIG4. However, it 
should be noted that relative fees do not tell directly is the fee’s absolute value higher, or are these 
results due of differences in customer portfolios for example. In addition, it was also believed that 
SOX restricted the providence of NAS, but results here implicate that auditors reduced these services 
already before SOX came into effect.  
 
Figure 10. Mean values of total fees for BIG4 and non-BIG4 auditors.  
 
 
Next, regression analysis is formed in order to examine this development more closely. In Table 10 
below are now all regression results considering variables AF, NAF and TF. As we can see from the 
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table, the average share of audit fees from revenue (intercept) is much higher for non-BIG4 firms. In 
bare audit fees, only around 0.5 percent from client’s revenue is going for audit fees when the auditor 
is in BIG4. Conversely, the same share is around 1% for non-BIG4 firms, so audit fees are twice as 
much than with BIG4. When the main reason to select non-BIG4 auditor might be that there’s 
assumption of lower audit fee levels, it is interesting to see that these results together with time series 
analysis suggest that the relative share of audit fees might actually be lower with BIG4 firms, not the 
other way around. However, these results do not give straight answer to that, when audit fees’ relative 
share is dependent on client portfolios, client’s revenue scale and above that, audits are priced based 
on risk levels as was explained in Chapter 2. For that reason, far-reaching conclusion about BIG4 
premium cannot be made based on relative values and without controlling those factors.  
 
Table 10. Parameter estimates for mean values of AF, NAF and TF. BIG4 and non-BIG4. 
Models:   
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (
𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢  
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (
𝑁𝐴𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢 
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (
𝑇𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑌−2000 + 𝑢 
 BIG4 non-BIG4 
  Intercept Trend Intercept Trend 
Audit Fees/Sales (AF2SALES) 0.005 0.00010 0.011 0.00047 
Non-Audit Fees/Sales (NAF2SALES) 0.003 -0.00011 0.003 -0.00007 
Total Fees/Sales (TF2SALES) 0.007 -0.00002* 0.014 0.00040 
Asterisk (*) indicates that the result is not statistically significant.  
 
Second observation from regression results is that the trend parameter estimates are positive for audit 
fees, but negative for non-audit fees for both auditor groups. This means that in general audit fees 
increase slightly every year, but non-audit fees decrease. This was already pointed out in previous 
figures. Also, the relative share of NAS-fees is surprisingly low, and for both groups the relative share 
of audit fees exceeds the share of non-audit fees as was also before. This is interesting to notice, when 
usually non-audit fees are seen as an important income source for audit firms, and auditors are more 
than willing to offer non-audit services, when they usually have higher income expectations than bare 
audit fees. According to Kinney et. al. (2004, 565) for example: “NAS fees are believed by many to 
yield higher profit rates than do audit fees. – Regulators also express concern that some audit fees are 
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too low because auditors may lowball audit fees to obtain lucrative consulting contracts.” While audit 
is strictly regulated and limited service, non-audit services on the other hand include large range of 
different consultancy services for example. There were even suggestions that auditors are willing to 
sacrifice their independence in exchange for retaining clients that pay large non-audit fees (DeFond 
et. al. 2002, 1248). However, as was mentioned previously, SOX had huge impact on services that 
auditors can provide, and especially non-audit related services were restricted. It can be suggested 
that SOX had such far-reaching effects that over 18-year period the trend variable for NAF is in fact 
negative. Also, as was visible in Figure 9, non-audit fees were already descending before SOX with 
both groups, and it only continued post-SOX.  
 
Previous results also indicated that the increase in total fees was mainly coming from audit fees, while 
non-audit fees decreased. Regression results support this partly, when audit fees’ trend coefficients 
are clearly positive whereas non-audit fees’ coefficients are negative. With non-BIG4 the results are 
simpler, when the total fees’ trend coefficient is also positive. This means that increase in total fees 
is purely coming from audit fees’ increase while non-audit fees decreased. However, with BIG4 
auditors the trend coefficient for total fees is actually negative, when the increase in audit fees has 
been small, whereas the decrease in non-audit fees has been large. This can be explained by 
suggestion made above, where increase in total fees was coming from audit fees, but especially from 
non-BIG4 firms’ audit fees. That is why the overall trend coefficient for total fees is positive with 
non-BIG4 and negative with BIG4 firms.  
 
These regression results thus support the assumption that audit fees have increased in general, but 
additional information was that with BIG4-auditors, the increase have been only minor. The 
parameter estimates for both trend variables were positive, but with BIG4 firms the increase in one 
year is only around 0.01 percentage points when with non-BIG4 firms it is 0.05 percentage points. 
When comparing intercepts of total fee variable, we get that when the auditor is in BIG4, total fees 
represent around 0.7 percent share from revenue, but with non-BIG4 auditor it is doubled, around 1.4 
percent. These results also suggest that there’s no ‘BIG4-premium’, when audit fees, non-audit fees 
and total fees are all at lower level with BIG4 than with non-BIG4 auditors. Even though relative 
shares are not optimal measure for this, results implicate that when the audit fees are compared to 
revenue, BIG4 firms can offer lower fees. However, BIG4-premium can be seen to be in correlation 
with client size like introduced in Chapter 2. According to Francis and Simon (1987) and other 
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studies, BIG4-premium exists, but only for smaller clients. Even though results above suggest that 
BIG4-premium doesn’t exist, it handled data as a whole. For achieving results that are more accurate,  
same regression is run for different deciles. Table 11 below summarizes results for the smallest and 
for largest decile. This enables us to investigate whether results support the assumption that BIG4-
premium only exists with smaller clients. Now the used data includes only BIG4-auditors.  
 
Table 11. Regression results for AF, NAF and TF for deciles 1 and 10. Only BIG4-auditors.  
Variable Decile 1 Decile 10 
 Intercept Trend Intercept Trend 
Audit Fees (AF) 0.038 0.0013 0.0005 0.00001* 
Non-Audit Fees (NAF) 0.015 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.00002 
Total Fees (TF) 0.053 0.0008* 0.0010 -0.00001 
Asterisk (*) indicates that the results are not statistically significant.  
 
As we can see from the table, all intercept and trend estimates are higher when considering Decile 1 
versus Decile 10, and that results differ noticeably from results in Table 10, where auditors were 
examined regardless the client size. Intercept values in Table 10 indicated that fees charged by BIG4-
auditors were less than with non-BIG4 auditors, when intercept for AF for instance was 0.5 percent. 
However, from this table we can see that the audit fee intercept is as high as 3.8 percent for smaller 
firms, and that the reason why whole sample got average audit fee to be 0.5 percent, is because with 
largest deciles the ratio is so low. With biggest firms the average percentage for audit fee ratio is only 
0.05 percent. The same goes with non-audit fees and total fees, when the relative share of biggest 
firms lowers the whole sample’s ratio reported before. For example, now the total fee trend-estima te 
is actually positive for Decile 1, when in Table 10 it was negative for whole sample. This means that 
total fees are decreased only for bigger firms, and that smaller firms suffered from increase.  
 
From trend variables it can also be seen that only audit fees have slightly increased when considering 
Decile 10, and that increase in both, audit fees and total fees, is remarkably higher with Decile 1. 
Although, it should be noted that non-audit fees have been decreasing more with Decile 1 than with 
Decile 10, and that two of the trend-variables are not statistically significant. This may indicate that 
the providence of non-audit services is reduced primarily from small clients. These results however 
support other studies introduced in Chapter 2. It seems that BIG4-premium is not observable when 
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fees are examined without client-size control. When clients are investigated as a whole, bigger firms 
lower average ratios when their relative results are distinctly lower than with smaller firms. However, 
when BIG4 auditors’ smallest clients are compared to biggest clients, the difference is easy to 
observe. The smallest client group, Decile 1, had over twice as much fees charged versus the average 
values from Table 10. Between Deciles 1 and 10 differences are naturally even larger. The average 
proportion of audit fees from revenue was 76 times higher for Decile 1 than for decile 10 (0.038 vs. 
0.0005). This is similar to result from 6.3.2, where auditor size was not controlled. There audit fees 
for Decile 1 was 78 times higher than for Decile 10. 
 
When the difference between the smallest and largest deciles is that large, it raises question whether 
there are differences regarding the auditor, and are premium fees asked by the half of non-BIG4 
auditors as well? For investigating this more closely, a separate sample where only companies from 
Decile 1 were included. These were then compared between BIG4 and non-BIG4 auditors using 
actual audit fee values, not regression model. For every observation inside this sample a ratio between 
audit fees and revenue was calculated, and an average value was derived from those. As expected, 
results implicate that it is more common for a small firm to be audited by auditor outside of BIG4. 
That is, the amount of companies audited by non-BIG4 was almost twice as the size of BIG4 auditees 
inside the Decile 1. However, it was surprising that there wasn’t that much difference in average audit 
fee ratio between these two auditor groups. When the auditor belonged in BIG4, the average audit fee 
from sales represented around 4.7 percent. In turn, when the auditor was non-BIG4, the average ratio 
was 5.0 percent. That is, smaller audit firms ask higher relative audit fees, but for both the audit fee 
ratio is substantially high. This result indicates that premium over basic audit fee is asked by both 
auditor groups – not by BIG4 auditors only.  
 
6.4.5. Canada and other foreign countries 
 
To this point, the whole study has been concentrated on U.S. markets and firms operating there. For 
creating comparison between the US and foreign countries, an analysis of audit fees in other regions 
is made. The initial sample included observations from US, Canada and other foreign countries, and 
Canada as well as foreign regions were removed in data adjusting. In Table 1 was presented the 
sample selection criteria, and how many foreign or Canadian companies were ruled out. In this 
analysis, all the other limitations presented in Table 1 are valid, so observation where revenue is less 
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than 100,000 dollars, the total fee ratio to revenue is over 20%, or the audit fee is not available are 
removed, just as was previously. In Table 1 there were 17,790 foreign companies. However, this 
number still included companies that had revenue below 100k, or total fees in relation to sales 
exceeded 20%. That is why now the sample size for foreign countries is only 12,467 firms. Same 
goes for Canadian companies, when initially there were 8,916 firms, but after all three deductions, 
there were only 3,846 companies left. Now, the time series analysis is first created for Canada and 
after that to foreign countries. Descriptive statistics for these datasets are presented in appendixes I 
and J at the end of this study.  
 
In Figure 11 below are presented the mean and median values of audit fees for sample including only 
Canadian companies. The figure is based on values presented in appendix K. Now, what is interest ing 
to observe, is that in Canada the audit fee development is almost the perfect opposite when compared 
to U.S. Now the starting level for average audit fees is rather high, with almost 2 percent audit fee 
ratio, when for US companies it was only around 0.5 percent. What is even more surprising, is that 
during the Enron and Arthur Andersen crisis, audit fees actually decreased rather than increased. This 
is even visible with median values. It is understandable that those cases affected mostly in United 
States and that SOX applies only to firms in US., but the instability in the market should have been 
most likely visible in Canada as well, when markets for the whole North America are rather 
homogenous. Also, despite the SOX applies only in US, Canada has its own regulation called ‘Bill 
198’ also known as C-SOX, and it was created in year 2002 as SOX was. According to Canadian tax 
attorneys (2015), it is quite equivalent to SOX, and that company that is publicly traded in Canada 
has to ensure compliance with Bill 198 requirements. They also added that technically, SOX cannot 
be enforced outside the United States, but this is only the case in certain scenarios. For companies 
that are publicly traded in Canada and are also listed on NYSE or NASDAQ, or cross listed, have to 
ensure compliance with SOX and BILL 198. (Prowse Chowne LLP Team, 2015). Nevertheless, it 
seems that the audit fee ratio started to rise from year 2003 onwards, which may indicate that the 
chaos in the US markets reached Canada only few years later. Even though the development of audit 
fees is almost the opposite when compared to U.S., the average audit fee rate however seems to 
stabilize close to 1% for both datasets, when coming to the last years of examination period. This 
may indicate that with U.S., the starting level was too low, and with Canada it was too high, and that 
audit fee level that satisfies both parties, is around 1 percent from the revenue.  
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Figure 11. Audit fees in relation to sales during 2000-2017. Canadian companies.  
  
 
It is also visible in the picture that peak years for Canadian companies in average values were 2000 
and 2007, when audit fee ratio was 1.9 percent. It is higher than with original sample, but the ratio 
turned down from year 2007 forward. When with US companies the overall trend during whole 
examination period was upward, here it is the opposite. In general view, audit fees in relation to 
revenue have decreased especially after year 2007. This is unexpected, when at that time the great 
recession started, and fees should have therefore increased. The actual audit fee ratio from year 2007 
to 2017 is almost halved, when the ratio is decreased by 48 percent. With median company changes 
are much harder to detect, but even with median values the general trend has been downwards. This 
is interesting observation, when the initial assumption was that audit fee development should be 
similar to US markets when these two regions have many similarities. When moving on to time series 
analysis for foreign regions, it wouldn’t be that surprising if the audit fee development differs from 
US, when e.g. Europe is far more different environment than Canada when compared to U.S. For 
example, European Union has unique tax legislation and custom system while Asian countries for 
instance have very different operating environment with low labor costs and concentration on export. 
Also, regulation is naturally diverse in different countries. The initial expectation would be that Enron 
and SOX didn’t have that much influence on foreign countries, when those took place mainly in US. 
Conversely, the global economic crisis 2007 onward should be visible, when it had massive impact 
globally. Figure 12 below characterizes audit fee development in foreign countries during 2000-2017. 
The graph is based on mean and median values introduced in Appendix L.   
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0,0 %
0,5 %
1,0 %
1,5 %
2,0 %
2,5 %
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
A
u
d
it
 f
e
e
s
/S
a
le
s
 (
%
)
Canadian companies
Frequncy mean(AF/SALES) median(AF/SALES)
 75 
Figure 12. Audit fees in relation to sales during 2000-2017. Foreign companies. 
 
 
As it is visible from the picture, audit fee development in foreign countries is far more similar to US 
companies than Canadian, and there’s also much more observations from this sample. The beginning 
level of audit fees is closer to US, when with foreign companies the starting level is around 0.8 versus 
0.5 in US. In Canada the starting level was as high as 1.9 percent.  The general trend is also upwards 
that was with US companies. However, it is surprising that crises in 2002 had great impact in foreign 
countries also, and that the global economic crisis didn’t increase the fees but in fact decreased them. 
These observations are basically the opposite for initial assumptions made above. The biggest 
difference between foreign and US companies is that the changes in the figure above are much more 
significant, and that the audit fee ratio has sawed back and forth much more. With US companies the 
decline was much more moderate, and after year 2007 there has been increase, not decrease. In US 
the decrease was actually few years before 2007, which is much more logical than the development 
here. Also, the latest trend in US markets were downwards, when audit fees started decline in year 
2014. Here the trend is converse, when the trend is steeply upwards during last examination years.  
However, it is worth noticing for that also here the audit fee ratio is close to 1.0 % when coming to 
year 2017, as was with US and Canadian companies. In summary, results considering foreign 
companies are similar to results with US companies, but results from Canadian time series analys is 
differ noticeably from results considering US and foreign countries. Regression results considering 
these two regions gave the same overall conclusion, when there were no differences or incoherence 
between these two methods. Therefore, regression results are not presented here.   
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
When the discussion around audit fees has been vivid during the whole 21st century because of major 
accounting scandals in the beginning of this millennium, it gave motivation to study whether audit 
fee levels are unreasonably high nowadays, especially for smaller firms. Therefore, the main objective 
of this study was to examine the development of relative audit fees over 18-year period, and whether 
there are differences between smaller and bigger auditees. A lot of research has been done in this 
millennium, and during the past two decades audit fees have been examined by several means. 
However, only few of the studies concentrated on audit fees’ long-term development. In turn, majority 
of the studies focused on examining one certain incident and its impact on audit fees, or what factors 
affect audit fees in general. Hence, an opposite approach was selected here, and the main objective 
was to examine how audit fees in relation to sales have been acting over time, and if there is clear 
trends, changes or anomalies, what are the reasons behind them. Second main objective was to 
examine these trends by controlling the client size. The two main research questions were derived 
from these.  
 
For making empirical tests and results more understandable, most common factors affecting audit 
fees and the basic logic behind audit fee pricing were introduced in the beginning of this study. The 
quality of an audit is also crucial element, when stakeholders usually demand audit quality in return 
for spent audit fees, and because it is strongly attached to SOX. For these reasons, audit quality and 
its role were considered in the third chapter as well. The methodology used in the study was 
quantitative analysis, including time series analyses and regression analyses. Time series analyses 
consisted of graphs that presented audit fee development in relation to sales during examination 
period, and they described the overall development of fees and emerged trends. Regression analyses 
in turn included results from simple and multiple regression models, and they offered more accurate 
results considering four hypotheses developed and reasoned in Chapter 4. Empirical tests started by 
observing the whole data set as a one, single sample and after that by different deciles. The data used 
was obtained from Audit Analytics database, and all modifications of the data and empirical tests 
were implemented with program called SAS. 
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The first research question handled audit fees as a whole, and expectation was that in general, relative 
audit fees have increased during the past 18 years. This was proved comprehensively, when all results 
considering complete sample indicated that relative audit fees were increased remarkably during the 
examination period. Both, mean and median values, resulted the final increase in ten years to be over 
a third, which can be considered as substantial. Furthermore, the main reason behind this development 
was SOX, when audit fees increased mainly during years 2001-2005. Based on time series analys is 
audit fees increased by 99% that time, and after that the increase was only moderate. For example, 
The Great Recession had only minor effect on audit fees, when the increase was only around 12% 
during years 2006-2010. With regressions, the overall increase was also considerable, 67 percent, 
even though it represented linear growth. However, it cannot be told from the results whether fees 
increased because of added requirements and additional effort due SOX, or because of improved audit 
quality. In addition, it was also interesting to notice that with complete sample, audit fees started to 
decline from year 2014 forward, and the decline was rather steep. There wasn’t one clear reason for 
this, but possible explanation is that pressure from unsatisfied clients became that strong, that audit 
firms were forced to lower their fees. Although, it may also indicate that there has been enough time 
for auditors to adjust to new regulation, and due learning curve fees have decreased. Also, it should 
be noted that there haven’t been significant changes or new regulation introduced in a long time , and 
the general economic environment is thus more stable at this day. This could lead to decreasing audit 
fee levels.  
 
With deciles, the general assumption was that smaller auditees have weaker position and therefore 
they are facing higher relative audit fees. Results from deciles’ empirical tests supported this 
assumption, when the first main finding was that even though the increase was substantial with 
complete sample, with deciles the increase was observable only for Deciles 1-4. With Deciles 5-10 
changes were only minor, and the overall trend was rather declining than increasing, especially after 
year 2004. This means that only smaller firms suffered from audit fees’ increase, and that the increase 
with complete sample was mainly coming from smaller firms. As said, with bigger companies the 
level of relative audit fees was rather steady until year 2004, but after that fees started to decline. The 
main increase for deciles occurred during SOX implements within years 2001-2005 as was with 
complete sample. Second important finding regarding deciles was that fees for Decile 1 were 
remarkably higher that they were for bigger firms. With Decile 1 the relative audit fee ratio was 
almost 6 percent in peak year 2011. With largest decile the ratio was just one-hundredth from that at 
the same year, and even between Decile 1 and 2 the difference was already notable. It was also proved 
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that smaller firms face more increase those fees as well, with is in line with the observation where 
audit fees for larger firms were decreasing after year 2004. That is, from all empirical results it was 
clearly visible that the bigger the firm, the smaller the relative audit fee. All results thus supported 
the initial assumption made with hypothesis development, where smaller firms were expected to face 
higher audit fees as well as more increase in those fees over time. 
 
From sensitivity analysis few important observations emerged as well. Firstly, when total fees and 
non-audit fees were reviewed besides pure audit fees, it was clearly observable that only audit fees 
were increased. Non-audit fees were mostly decreased, which means that if total fees were increased, 
it was mainly coming from audit fees. Natural explanation for decreased non-audit fees would be 
SOX, because it restricted the providence of non-audit services. However, it was interesting to notice 
that especially with BIG4-auditors, non-audit fees started to decline way before SOX was implied, 
and non-audit fees reduced only minorly post-SOX. In addition, before SOX came into force, BIG4-
firms offered as much audit services as non-audit services, when the fee ratios were almost at same 
level. After SOX, the portion of non-audit services was at low level, and audit fees represented 
majority of audit firms’ fees. Yet, if SOX prohibited to offer non-audit services and the proportion 
decline because of that, why non-audit fees reduced already before SOX came into effect? I wasn’t 
able to find one simple explanation for that. Furthermore, SOX seemed to have had much more impact 
on non-BIG4 auditors than to BIG4-auditors. In fact, with BIG4 audit fees and total fees remained 
rather stable during the whole investigation period, and only non-audit fees declined, but even them 
pre-SOX. On the contrary, audit fees and total fees increased remarkably for non-BIG4 auditors 
during 2001-2005, and non-audit fees declined, but clearly less than with BIG4 firms. This result 
indicated that the increase that was observable with complete sample, was coming from non-BIG4 
firms’ audit fees, not from all audit providers. The last main finding relates to BIG4 auditors as well, 
when it was found that BIG4-premium existed, but only for small firms. Bigger firms had lower 
relative fees even when audited by BIG4 auditor. That is interesting, when usually all factors affecting 
audit fee are positively correlated with client size. Despite that, Decile 1 had 76 times higher relative 
audit fee than Decile 10 when regarding BIG4 clients.  
 
When reviewing prior literature, there wasn’t that much research about the appropriate level of audit 
fees or what is the role of audit quality. Also, studies regarding audit quality have had incoherent 
results, and there’s no consensus about factors that improve the quality and factors that weaken it. 
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For example, several authors such as Johnson (2002), Myers (2003) and Francis (2004) reported that 
SOX includes unnecessary regulation, which doesn’t serve its initial purpose. For instance, auditor 
tenure wasn’t reducing audit quality according to them as it was generally believed. When audit 
quality is extremely difficult to measure objectively, and when we do not know from prior research 
the optimal level of audit quality, it is questioned whether audit fees compensate the quality level, 
especially if audit fees are considerably high. Is there too much audit quality resulting too high aud it 
fees? Based on results from empirical tests, audit fees increased mainly during SOX implement, so it 
is reasonable to assume that at least partly the increase was due of improved audit quality. Especially 
when the impact of SOX seemed to be more powerful for non-BIG4 auditors, it may implicate that 
their audit quality increased, when it could expect to be at lower level pre-SOX when compared to 
BIG4 auditors. However, when BIG4 auditor fees remained rather same despite the SOX, it may also 
indicate that implement costs were simply much higher for smaller auditors and it required more 
effort from them, and for that reason fees went up only for non-BIG4 auditors. When analysis of 
relative audit fees suits poorly for evaluating audit quality, SOX’s benefits remain unclear.  
 
This study contributes to prior literature and research at least in four ways. First, outcomes from 
empirical tests supported for example Audit Analytics’ (2014) and Asthana et al. (2009) results, that 
audit fees have increased remarkably during the investigation period. Every test made in chapter six 
supported the assumption that relative fees have went up. Related to this, results are also in line with 
Audit Analytics’ (2014), Raghunandan & Rama’s (2006) as well as with Francis’ (2004) studies, 
where SOX was seen as main reason behind increased audit fees. From time series diagrams it was 
visible that with every sample despite the client size, the biggest increase was between years 2001-
2005 – the time that SOX would have had the most impact. In addition, results considering different 
deciles suggested that smaller firms pay relatively more audit fees than bigger firms do. Francis 
(2004), Audit Analytics (2014) and Iliev (2010) all got similar results, that is, smaller firms face 
relatively higher audit fee levels. Lastly, results from this study supported the assumption of BIG4-
premium existing only for small clients, as Choi et al. (2008) and Francis & Simon (1987) suggested. 
From sensitivity analysis it was clearly visible that premium fees were directed only for smaller 
clients, and that larger clients had relative fees close to zero. Thus, all results were in line with 
previous studies and offered additional evidence and proof for those results being valid.  
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What comes to limitations of this study, the first one is that regression models lean on assumption of 
ceteris paribus. For that reason, models cannot consider every possible aspect, and results are based 
on presumption that all other relevant factors outside the model are held fixed. This should be noted 
especially with simple regression models. The second limitation is the possibility for 
multicollinearity, but is should be emphasized that this considers only Model (3), where mult ip le 
regression was used, and furthermore, it is highly unlikely that those explanatory variables would be 
perfectly correlated to each other. For that reason, the basic assumption is that there’s no 
multicollinearity regarding Model (3). The third and fourth limitations relate to data used in the study. 
Even though data was adjusted before empirical tests, it may still contain errors, incorrect information 
or outliers. With data modifications all the blanks and possible outliers for example were removed, 
but there’s still possibility that remaining data is imperfect. However, the source of the data is reliable, 
and after several data adjustments, it should suit adequately for the purposes of this study. The third 
and last limitation is that the data includes only companies that are based in U.S., SEC registrants, 
are publicly listed and traded, and have done electronic filing during 2000-2017. Thus, results are 
poorly generalizable for private companies and outside of United States, even though Canadian and 
foreign companies were included in sensitivity analysis.  
 
There are several possibilities for further research around this topic. For example, it could be 
interesting to study more thoroughly, how large proportion of firms would eventually turn from 
unprofitable to profitable, if audit fees would be lowered, or removed entirely. Another research topic 
could be price discussions between audit firms and their clients, and especially power issues during 
negotiations. How unilaterally audit firms can assess the fee level, and when the client is big and 
important enough, that it affects the final price of the audit? The pricing of audit alone would offer 
numerous research problems as well, when it could be examined how e.g. tenure or changes in the 
client’s operational environment affect the asked audit fee. Additionally, more accurate research 
about the effects of SOX and Great Recession could be made, for example, what was the main reason 
behind fees’ increase starting from year 2002 due SOX. Was it because of additional audit work and 
effort, increased risks or because audit quality improved? Or was it possibly a combination of these? 
Also, why the level of non-audit fees decreased mainly before SOX? Lastly, one interesting research 
topic could also be the BIG4-premium when regarding smaller clients. It would be generally useful 
information to know more accurately, what client size triggers the BIG4-premium, and what are the 
true reasons behind that. 
  
References 
 
 
Acharya, V., Philippon, T., Richardson, M. & Roubini, N., 2009. The Financial Crisis of 2007‐2009: 
Causes and Remedies. New York University Salomon Center. Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 89. 
 
Ashbaugh, H., LaFond, R. & Mayhew, B.W. 2003. Do Non-audit Services Compromise Auditor 
Independence? Further Evidence. The Accounting Review. Vol. 78 No. 3, pp. 611-639. 
 
Ashbaugh-Kaife, H., Collins, D.W. & Kinney, W.R. 2007. The discovery and reporting of interna l 
control deficiencies prior to SOX-mandated audits. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 44 
No1-2, pp. 166–192. 
 
Asthana, S., Balsam, S., Kim, S., 2009. The effect of Enron, Andersen, and Sarbanes‐Oxley on the 
US market for audit services. Accounting Research Journal. Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 6-7.  
 
Beatty, R.P. 1989. Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings. The Accounting 
Review. Vol. 64 No. 4, pp. 707. 
 
Chambers, D. & Payne, J.L. 2011. Audit Quality and Accrual Persistence: Evidence from the Pre- 
and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods. Managerial Auditing Journal. Vol. 26 No. 5, pp. 437-456. 
 
Chang, S., Tsai, C., Shih, D. & Hwang, C. 2008. The development of audit detection risk assessment 
system: Using the fuzzy theory and audit risk model. Expert Systems with Applications. Vol. 35 No. 
3, pp. 1053-1067. 
 
  
Choi, J., Kim, J., Liu, X. & Simunic, D.A. 2008. Audit pricing, legal liability regimes, and Big 4 
premiums: Theory and cross‐country evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research. Vol. 25 No. 1, 
pp. 55, 84.  
 
Choi, J., Kim, J. & Zang, Y. 2010. Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality? Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice and Theory. Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 115-140. 
 
Collins, D., 2016. Arthur Andersen – American company. Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Arthur-Andersen. Referenced 15.11.2018.  
 
Craswell, A., Stokes, D.J. & Laughton, J. 2002. Auditor independence and fee dependence. Journal 
of Accounting and Economic. Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 253-275.  
 
DeAngelo, L.E. 1981. Auditor Size and Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 
3 No. 3, pp. 197.  
 
DeFond, M.L., Raghunandan, K. & Subramanyam, K.R. 2002. Do Non-Audit Service Fees Impair 
Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions. Journal of Accounting 
Research. Vol. 40 No. 4. pp. 1248.  
 
Eilifsen, A., Messier, W.F., Glover, S.M., Prawitt, D.F., 2014. Auditing & Assurance services. 3rd 
international edition. McGraw-Hill Education UK. pp. 6-7; 186-187. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management 
Review. Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 57-74.  
 
  
Ettredge, M., Fuerherm, E.E. & Li, C., 2014. Fee pressure and audit quality. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society. Vol. 39 No. 4, pp. 249, 260. 
 
Felix, W.L. JR., Gramling, A.A. & Maletta, M.J. 2001. The Contribution of Internal Audit as a 
Determinant of External Audit Fees and Factors Influencing This Contribution. Journal of 
Accounting Research. Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 513-514, f528-530.  
 
Ferguson, A., Francis, J.R. & Stokes, D.J. 2003. The Effects of Firm-Wide and Office-Level 
Industry Expertise on Audit Pricing. The Accounting Review. Vol. 78 No. 2, pp. 430. 
 
Financial Executives International (FEI). 2007. FEI Survey: Average 2007 SOX Compliance Cost 
$1.7 Million. Financial Executives International. Available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110714064622/http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=20
4.  Referenced 15.11.2018. 
 
Firth, M. 1997. The Provision of Non-Audit Services and The Pricing of Audit Fees. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting. Vol. 24 No. 3 & 4, pp. 512.  
 
Francis, J.R. 1984. THE EFFECT OF AUDIT FIRM SIZE ON AUDIT PRICES. A Study of the 
Australian Market. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 133-151. 
 
Francis, J.R. 2004. What do we know about audit quality. The British Accounting Review. Vol. 36, 
pp. 345–368.  
 
Francis, J.R. & Simon, D.T. 1987. A Test of Audit Pricing in the Small-Client Segment of the U. S. 
Audit Market. The Accounting Review. Vol. 62 No. 1, pp. 148-156. 
 
  
Francis, J.R. & Stokes, D.J. 1986. Audit Prices, Product Differentiation, and Scale Economies : 
Further Evidence from the Australian Market. Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 
383-393. 
 
Francis, J.R. & Yu, M.D. 2009. Big 4 Office Size and Audit Quality. The Accounting Review. Vol. 
84, No. 5, pp. 1549.  
 
Frankel, R.M., Johnson, M.F. & Nelson, K.K. 2002. The Relation between Auditors' Fees for 
Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management. The Accounting Review. Vol. 77, Supplement: Quality 
of Earnings Conference (2002), pp. 71-105.  
 
Gates, S.K., Lowe, J.D. & Reckers, P.M.J., 2007. Restoring public confidence in capital markets 
through auditor rotation. Managerial Auditing Journal. Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 5-6.  
 
Ghosh, A. & Moon, D. 2005. Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality. The Accounting Review. Vol. 
80 No. 2, pp. 585-612.  
 
Gul, F.A. 1991. Size of Audit Fees and Perceptions of Auditors' Ability to Resist Management 
Pressure in Audit Conflict Situations. Abacus. Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 163.  
 
Gul, F.A., Fung, S. & Jaggi, B. 2009. Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of auditor tenure 
and auditors’ industry expertise. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 47 No. 3, pp. 265–268. 
 
Gunny, K., Krishnan, G. & Zhang, T. 2007. Is Audit Quality Associated with Auditor Tenure, 
Industry expertise, and fees? Evidence from PCAOB Opinions. SSRN. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015089. pp. 30.  
 
  
Hay, D.C. 2017. Audit fee Research on Issues Related to Ethics. Current Issues in Auditing. American 
Accounting Association. Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. A4. 
 
Hogan, C.E & Wilkins, M.S. 2008. Evidence on the Audit Risk Model: Do Auditors Increase Audit 
Fees in the Presence of Internal Control Deficiencies? Contemporary Accounting Research. Vol. 25 
No. 1, pp. 219-221, 236 
 
Hoitash, R., Markelevich, A. & Barragato, C.A. 2007. Auditor fees and audit quality. Managerial 
Auditing Journal. Vol. 22 No. 8, pp. 761-786.  
 
Holm, C. & Zaman, M., 2012. Regulating audit quality: Restoring trust and legitimacy. Accounting 
Forum. Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 51, 61.  
 
Houston, R.W., Peters, M.F. & Pratt, J.H. 1999. The Audit Risk Model, Business Risk and Audit-
Planning Decisions. The Accounting Review. Vol. 74 No. 3, pp. 284.  
 
Iliev, P. 2010. The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices. The Journal 
of Finance. Vol. 65 No. 3, pp. 1166, 1193.  
 
Johnson, V.E., Khurana, I.K. & Reynolds, J.K., 2002. Audit-Firm Tenure and the Quality of Financia l 
Reports. Contemporary Accounting Research. Vol. 19 No. 4, pp. 641, 655.  
 
Kenton, Will. 2019. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Investopedia. 
Available at: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dodd-frank-financial-regulatory-reform-bill.asp 
Referenced 16.5.2019. 
 
  
Kinney W.R. Jr., Palmrose, Z. and Scholz, S. 2004. Auditor Independence, Non-Audit Services, and 
Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right? Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 42 No. 3. pp. 
563-565.  
 
Kohlbeck, M., Mayhew, B.W., Murphy, P., Wilkins, M.S. 2010. Competition for Andersen's Clients. 
Contemporary Accounting Research. Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 1100.  
 
Lim, C. & Tan, H. 2008. Non-audit Service Fees and Audit Quality: The Impact of Auditor 
Specialization. Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 46 No. 1, pp. 199-246.  
 
Myers, J.N., Myers, L.A. & Omer, T.C. 2003. Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship 
and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? The Accounting Review. Vol. 
78 No. 3, pp. 796.  
 
O’Keefe, T.B., Simunic, D.A. & Stein, M.T., 1994. The Production of Audit Services: Evidence from 
a Major Public Accounting Firm. Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 252. 
 
Oppel, R. & Eichenwald, K., 2002. Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Arthur Andersen Fires an 
Exectuive for Enron Orders. The New York Times. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/enron-s-collapse-overview-arthur-andersen-fires-
executive-for-enron-orders.html. Referenced at 15.11.2018.  
 
Palmrose, Z. 1986. Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence. Journal of Accounting 
Research. Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 108-109.  
 
Palmrose, Z. 1988. 1987 Competitive Manuscript Co-Winner: An Analysis of Auditor Litigation 
and Audit Service Quality. The Accounting Review. Vol. 63 No. 1, pp. 55-73.  
 
  
Pong, C.M. and Whittington, G. 1994. The Determinants of Audit Fees: Some Empirical models. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. Vol. 21 No. 8, pp. 1072.  
 
Prowse Chowne LLP Team, 2015. When do Canadian Companies Need To Be American SOX 
Compliant. Business Lawyer Edmonton, Canadian Tax Attorney. Available at: 
https://prowsechowne.com/when-do-canadian-companies-need-to-be-american-sox-compliant/. 
Referenced 13.12.2018.  
 
Raiborn, C., Schorg, C.A. & Massoud, M. 2006. Should auditor rotation be mandatory? The 
Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance. Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 41. 
 
Scott, W.R. 2014. Financial Accounting Theory. 7th edition. Pearson. pp. 8-9.  
 
Segal, T., 2018. Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling. Investopedia, LLC. Available at: 
https://www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/. Referenced 15.11.2018. 
 
Simunic, D.A., 1980. The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Accounting 
Research. Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 189. 
 
SOX-online, 2018. Section 201 – Prohibited Auditor Activities. Available at: http://www.sox-
online.com/key-sections/section-201-prohibited-auditor-activities/. Referenced 21.11.2018.  
 
Tanyi, P., Raghunandan, K. & Barua, A. 2010. Audit Report Lags after Voluntary and Involuntary 
Auditor Changes. Accounting Horizons. Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 674.   
 
The CPA Journal, 2016. Have Audits Become Too Inefficient And Expensive? The CPA Journal – 
The Voice of the Profession. Available at: https://www.cpajournal.com/2016/02/01/audits-become-
inefficient-expensive/. Referenced  17.12.2018.  
  
Uang, J., Citron, D.B., Sudarsanam, S. & Taffler, R.J. 2006. Management Going-concern 
Disclosures: Impact of Corporate Governance and Auditor Reputation. European Financial 
Management. Vol. 12 No. 5, pp. 790-795. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2012. Introductory Econometrics A Modern Approach. 5th edition. Michigan State 
University. pp. 12, 22.  
 
 
  
  
Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Data distribution to deciles 
Decile N 
Decile 1 12,380 
Decile 2 12,389 
Decile 3 12,391 
Decile 4 12,389 
Decile 5 12,386 
Decile 6 12,393 
Decile 7 12,391 
Decile 8 12,388 
Decile 9 12,391 
Decile 10 12,382 
Total 123,880 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Frequency of observations by fiscal years. 
Fiscal Year N 
2000 3 969 
2001 6 161 
2002 8 201 
2003 8 934 
2004 9 003 
2005 8 944 
2006 8 374 
2007 7 394 
2008 7 410 
2009 6 895 
2010 6 557 
2011 6 202 
2012 5 931 
2013 5 927 
2014 5 951 
2015 6 416 
2016 6 138 
2017 5 473 
Total 123 880 
  
Appendix C. Data distribution to quintiles. 
Quintile N 
1 24,769 
2 24,780 
3 24,779 
4 24,779 
5 24,773 
Total 123,880 
 
 
 
Appendix D. Mean values of AF2SALES during 2000-2017. Quintiles 1-5.  
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
2000 0.018 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 
2001 0.017 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 
2002 0.024 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 
2003 0.030 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 
2004 0.031 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2005 0.033 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.001 
2006 0.031 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2007 0.033 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2008 0.034 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2009 0.034 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2010 0.037 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2011 0.037 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001 
2012 0.036 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001 
2013 0.038 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2014 0.039 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2015 0.036 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2016 0.035 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.001 
2017 0.033 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix E. Yearly median values of audit fees by complete sample. 
Year N Median for AF2SALES 
2000 3,969 0.00138 
2001 6,161 0.00140 
2002 8,201 0.00175 
2003 8,934 0.00202 
2004 9,003 0.00265 
2005 8,944 0.00276 
2006 8,374 0.00266 
2007 7,394 0.00266 
2008 7,410 0.00263 
2009 6,895 0.00287 
2010 6,557 0.00281 
2011 6,202 0.00266 
2012 5,931 0.00259 
2013 5,927 0.00263 
2014 5,951 0.00271 
2015 6,416 0.00272 
2016 6,138 0.00267 
2017 5,473 0.00250 
Total 123,880  
 
Appendix F. Yearly mean and median values for total fees by complete sample.  
Year N Mean for TF2SALES Median for TF2SALES 
2000 3,969 0.0090 0.0028 
2001 6,161 0.0078 0.0027 
2002 8,201 0.0088 0.0028 
2003 8,934 0.0100 0.0029 
2004 9,003 0.0111 0.0035 
2005 8,944 0.0113 0.0035 
2006 8,374 0.0105 0.0032 
2007 7,394 0.0108 0.0032 
2008 7,410 0.0109 0.0031 
2009 6,895 0.0111 0.0034 
2010 6,557 0.0117 0.0034 
2011 6,202 0.0114 0.0032 
2012 5,931 0.0112 0.0032 
2013 5,927 0.0115 0.0032 
2014 5,951 0.0119 0.0033 
2015 6,416 0.0116 0.0033 
2016 6,138 0.0112 0.0032 
2017 5,473 0.0105 0.0030 
Total 123,880   
  
Appendix G. Mean values of AF, NAF and TF. BIG4 auditors.  
Year N mean_AF2SALES mean_NAF2SALES mean_TF2SALES 
2000 2,626 0.0040 0.0046 0.0086 
2001 4,065 0.0041 0.0030 0.0071 
2002 5,920 0.0048 0.0020 0.0068 
2003 6,552 0.0052 0.0018 0.0070 
2004 6,334 0.0060 0.0016 0.0076 
2005 5,926 0.0055 0.0011 0.0066 
2006 5,477 0.0053 0.0010 0.0063 
2007 4,710 0.0057 0.0010 0.0067 
2008 4,642 0.0052 0.0009 0.0061 
2009 4,319 0.0058 0.0010 0.0069 
2010 4,073 0.0060 0.0011 0.0071 
2011 3,909 0.0056 0.0011 0.0066 
2012 3,884 0.0057 0.0011 0.0068 
2013 3,883 0.0063 0.0010 0.0073 
2014 3,865 0.0059 0.0011 0.0070 
2015 4,268 0.0059 0.0010 0.0070 
2016 4,075 0.0062 0.0010 0.0072 
2017 3,651 0.0061 0.0012 0.0073 
Total 82,179    
 
 
Appendix H. Mean values of AF, NAF and TF. Non-BIG4 auditors.  
Year N mean_AF2SALES mean_NAF2SALES mean_TF2SALES 
2000 1,343 0.0066 0.0033 0.0099 
2001 2,096 0.0061 0.0029 0.0090 
2002 2,281 0.0113 0.0026 0.0140 
2003 2,382 0.0157 0.0027 0.0184 
2004 2,669 0.0167 0.0026 0.0193 
2005 3,018 0.0176 0.0028 0.0205 
2006 2,897 0.0162 0.0021 0.0183 
2007 2,684 0.0158 0.0023 0.0182 
2008 2,768 0.0167 0.0021 0.0188 
2009 2,576 0.0162 0.0021 0.0182 
2010 2,484 0.0169 0.0022 0.0191 
2011 2,293 0.0175 0.0020 0.0195 
2012 2,047 0.0176 0.0019 0.0195 
2013 2,044 0.0176 0.0019 0.0195 
2014 2,086 0.0189 0.0021 0.0210 
2015 2,148 0.0184 0.0023 0.0207 
2016 2,063 0.0173 0.0019 0.0192 
2017 1,822 0.0151 0.0018 0.0170 
Total 41,701    
  
Appendix I. Descriptive statistics for data including only Canadian companies.   
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
Revenue 3,846 2,359,665,926 5,650,256,193 100,000 174,346,000 50,069,000,000 
Audit Fees 3,846 1,694,385 4,100,305 835 418,751 59,500,000 
Non-Audit 
Fees 
3,846 
534,928 1,624,585 0 105,050 30,100,000 
Total Fees 3,846 2,229,313 5,261,529 835 580,230 72,700,000 
Audit 
fees/Sales 
3,846 
0.01289 0.02606 0.00000 0.00268 0.19021 
Non-audit 
fees/Sales 
3,846 
0.00314 0.00964 0.00000 0.00037 0.16644 
Total 
fees/Sales 
3,846 
0.01603 0.03088 0.00002 0.00362 0.19796 
BIG4 3,846 0.74077 0.43827 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
 
 
 
Appendix J. Descriptive statistics for data where including only foreign companies   
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
Revenue 12,467 9,156,886,633 29,358,265,730 100,000 469,390,000 475,778,000,000 
Audit Fees 12,467 3,778,896 8,535,182 500 769,964 90,200,000 
Non-Audit 
Fees 
12,467 1,344,903 4,517,137 0 99,000 114,600,000 
Total Fees 12,467 5,123,799 11,679,744 500 985,310 131,315,000 
Audit 
fees/Sales 
12,467 0.0068 0.0178 0.0000 0.0015 0.1990 
Non-audit 
fees/Sales 
12,467 0.0012 0.0051 0.0000 0.0001 0.1599 
Total 
fees/Sales 
12,467 0.0080 0.0200 0.0000 0.0020 0.1990 
BIG4 12,467 0.7524 0.4316 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix K. Yearly mean and median values for Canadian companies. 
Year N mean_AF2SALES median_AF2SALES 
2000 24 0.0190 0.0065 
2001 48 0.0186 0.0053 
2002 244 0.0118 0.0022 
2003 308 0.0105 0.0023 
2004 346 0.0127 0.0030 
2005 338 0.0156 0.0040 
2006 275 0.0180 0.0041 
2007 215 0.0191 0.0036 
2008 238 0.0175 0.0035 
2009 237 0.0126 0.0033 
2010 232 0.0116 0.0028 
2011 221 0.0117 0.0022 
2012 199 0.0092 0.0021 
2013 198 0.0089 0.0019 
2014 194 0.0100 0.0019 
2015 200 0.0103 0.0019 
2016 197 0.0105 0.0019 
2017 132 0.0099 0.0022 
Total 3,846   
 
Appendix L. Yearly mean and median values for foreign companies. 
 Year N mean_AF2SALES median_AF2SALES 
2000 58 0.0076 0.0016 
2001 121 0.0064 0.0011 
2002 644 0.0045 0.0008 
2003 833 0.0054 0.0008 
2004 857 0.0058 0.0010 
2005 866 0.0064 0.0012 
2006 745 0.0069 0.0015 
2007 681 0.0076 0.0017 
2008 816 0.0063 0.0019 
2009 836 0.0061 0.0019 
2010 847 0.0055 0.0018 
2011 808 0.0065 0.0017 
2012 753 0.0067 0.0017 
2013 765 0.0074 0.0018 
2014 764 0.0085 0.0018 
2015 764 0.0082 0.0018 
2016 767 0.0084 0.0018 
2017 542 0.0101 0.0020 
Total 12,467   
